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FOREWORD
The Russian Federation continues to present a clear
and unique security challenge to its European neighbor states all around its Western periphery. To the
north, in the Nordic-Baltic region, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its Nordic partner nations are acutely aware of the challenge which
Russia’s forceful and at times aggressive behavior
can present to their security. The situation has been
compounded by internal factors, such as a decade of
shrinking defense budgets and a lack of local capacity
to deal with potential military threats.
As the United States and NATO strive to craft a
credible deterrence policy in the Nordic-Baltic region,
which would serve both local and U.S. interests in safeguarding local allies and partners while limiting the
need for permanent presence in the region, NATO’s
Nordic partner nations, Finland and Sweden, are wellplaced to make a meaningful contribution to these
efforts. Deeper defense cooperation with and among
the Nordic countries, including NATO member state
Norway, is an essential part of this solution. Regardless of dissimilarities between their defense concepts
and capabilities, the Nordic nations as a whole share
similar priorities and are faced with similar threats. It
thus makes absolute sense for these nations to cooperate both mutually and more broadly.
This monograph, written by two highly experienced
Finnish defense researchers with excellent knowledge of the problems posed by Russia as a neighbor,
enhances our understanding of the possibilities and
constraints of Nordic defense and Russia’s regional
offensive military potential. It illustrates possible avenues for enhancing defense cooperation, with specific
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and actionable proposals. The role of the U.S. Army is
considered vis-à-vis efforts to ensure stability based on
credible deterrence in the region.
This monograph builds on the scope and analysis
of the issues discussed in the Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press monograph,
Breaking the Nordic Defense Deadlock, published in 2015.
It further develops our understanding of opportunities for the United States to increase the effectiveness
of defense cooperation with northern Europe, and is
highly recommended to planners and policymakers as
well as other experts working on European and NATO
problem sets.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This monograph examines enhanced roles for Finland and Sweden as contributors to the efforts of the
United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to forge a credible deterrence policy in
the Nordic-Baltic region. The impact of these enhanced
roles on the requirement for a U.S. military presence in
the region could have both strategic and operational
implications and might reduce the U.S.-Europe capabilities gap and enable fairer defense burden-sharing
within the Euro-Atlantic community.
Over the last decade, there have been three security trends that have worsened the security situation in
the region: all European states have drastically downscaled their defense capabilities, the United States has
shifted its focus away from Europe, and Russia has
enhanced its capabilities and exhibited the political will
to use force to promote its interests. In response, the
United States and NATO have stressed that they are
fully committed to defending all allied countries, particularly the Baltic States and Poland. However, these
statements must be backed up by military resources
and a credible deterrence posture that is respected by
potential adversaries.
A consensus on the requirement for territorial
defense is forming within NATO and allied nations. A
visible and robust military presence in the region is an
essential element of the credibility of deterrence. With
the limited resources available for a commitment by all
partners, including the United States, creative means
must be found to maximize the deterrent potential of
national forces through greater and deeper international cooperation and coordination. Consequently,
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transforming and restoring member-state and allied
capabilities is of paramount importance.
In the short term, more exercises on the present
level and further cooperation within the region help
achieve the aim of a more credible deterrence posture.
Enhancing specific aspects of partnership militarily
with nonaligned Finland and Sweden would improve
the prospects for meeting these challenges. Both of
these Nordic partner countries are deeply engaged not
only in military cooperation with NATO collectively
but also on a bilateral basis with the United States and
regional allies such as Norway.
However, these three Nordic countries have widely
disparate military capabilities, affecting interoperability and prospects for defense cooperation:
• Norway focuses on its collective responsibilities
within NATO and invests accordingly in maritime military capabilities.
• Finland, bordering strategically important Russian military areas, is searching for reliable and
capable partners for deeper defense cooperation. Finnish military capabilities are primarily
land-heavy, reflecting its geographical position.
• Sweden is currently transforming the focus of
its system back to territorial defense with additional capabilities.
• Regardless of dissimilarities in defense concepts
and capabilities, common ground exists due to
the recognition of a shared security environment and similarities of threats.
Likewise, the U.S. Army shares similar responsibilities―to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty
of allies in the region. This monograph illustrates possible avenues for enhancing defense cooperation with
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specific and actionable proposals. This monograph
also identifies some of the limits of defense cooperation
and partnership. The role of the U.S. Army is assigned
a special level of importance with respect to deterrence
and striving for stability based on credible deterrence
in the region.
While national defense authorities are already
strengthening the synergies of military capabilities,
lengthy political processes can proceed concurrently.
The prerequisite that the U.S. pledge to uphold regional
security is of sufficient plausibility to convince regional
partners that if this security arrangement is challenged,
the U.S. commitment will prevail. This monograph
includes efficient and actionable proposals for specific
measures to this end.
This monograph, completed in late 2018, broadens
the scope and analysis of the issues discussed in the
Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College
Press monograph, Breaking the Nordic Defense Deadlock,
published in 2015.
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DETERRENCE IN THE NORDIC-BALTIC
REGION: THE ROLE OF THE NORDIC
COUNTRIES TOGETHER WITH THE U.S. ARMY
INTRODUCTION
This monograph, Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic
Region, examines possible roles for nonaligned Finland and Sweden as contributors to the efforts of the
United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to create a credible deterrence policy
in the Nordic-Baltic region. In addition, the potential
strategic and operational implications of reconfiguring the U.S. military presence in the region―and that
of the U.S. Army, in particular―are analyzed. Furthermore, possible ways of reducing the U.S.-Europe
capabilities gap and enabling fairer burden-sharing
are considered.
Three security trends have worsened the security situation in the Nordic-Baltic region over the
last decade: European states have downscaled their
defense capabilities, the United States has shifted its
focus away from Europe, and Russia has enhanced
its military capabilities and exhibited its political will
to use force to promote its interests. Even before the
conflict in Ukraine, and the war in Georgia before it,
Russia had begun expanding its military activities in
the Baltic Sea region.1 This expansion involved not
only regular exercises in the air and at sea but also
large-scale exercises on land practicing offensive action
and risky, even dangerous, behavior. Furthermore,
the use of hybrid methods, including cyberattacks, has
contributed to the loss of confidence in the region, creating an asymmetry between Russia and its rivals and
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eroding stability and predictability. NATO has been
far less active than Russia, and its limited responses to
Russian actions have not had an escalatory effect.2
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of Russia’s unlawful
annexation of Crimea and war by proxy in Ukraine,
the overall situation has drastically deteriorated. The
United States and NATO have stressed that they are
fully committed to defending all allied countries,
particularly the Baltic States and Poland, which face
challenges to their security and sovereignty. This
commitment was emphasized by senior officials serving in the new U.S. Presidential administration at the
Munich Security Conference in Germany in February
2017, and has been reaffirmed later.3
Political declarations of intent are, however, not
enough to fulfill the core purpose of the Atlantic Alliance. They must be backed up by military resources
and a credible deterrence posture that is recognized and respected by potential adversaries. NATO
embarked on this path at the Wales Summit in Great
Britain in 2014 and affirmed this direction at the
Warsaw Summit in Poland in 2016 and the Brussels
Summit in Belgium in 2018. To date, NATO’s capabilities suffice for deterrence by punishment, but not
necessarily for deterrence by denial in the Baltic Sea
region. NATO’s deterrence posture, as well as that
of the U.S. Army, should be based on several pillars:
contingency planning that prescribes the capabilities required to resist both sudden hostile actions and
more subtle attempts to create protracted (“frozen”)
conflicts; guaranteeing that force levels in the conflict
area are sustained, with reinforcements and follow-on
forces forthcoming; protecting allied forces in the conflict area; and, preparing for the possibility of nuclear
coercion.
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It is increasingly clear that close partnership with
militarily nonaligned Finland and Sweden would
significantly improve the prospects for successfully
meeting these challenges. As Enhanced Opportunities
partners in the context of the Partnership for Peace
(PfP), both countries are deeply engaged in military
cooperation with NATO collectively and on a bilateral
basis with the United States and regional allies, such
as Norway. However, Nordic countries have widely
disparate military capabilities that affect interoperability and prospects for defense cooperation. Streamlining these for an optimal joint performance, however
desirable, is a profound, lengthy, political process for
these countries.
In this monograph, the authors outline possible
avenues for maximizing defense and security cooperation in the Nordic-Baltic region and identify the limits
of partnership. The role of the U.S. Army is assigned
special importance with respect to deterrence and
establishing a military balance in the region.
The authors argue that building up military capabilities in coordination with the Nordic countries is
essential and can be pursued concurrently with the
lengthy political processes leading to greater integration. This option requires the United States to convince
regional partners that it can be relied on if this security
arrangement is seriously challenged by adversaries.
Now is the time for serious decisions on NordicBaltic security, as the erosion of defense capabilities
has made all states in the region increasingly vulnerable. In the region’s northernmost country, Norway,
military manpower has been reduced to a minimum.
Despite this deficit, Norway maintains only a limited focus on the exceptional capabilities that would
be required to offset its limited manpower. Finland
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has based its defense posture on territorial defense,
while Sweden has counted on its expeditionary capabilities that are high-quality, yet low-strength. The
three Nordic countries must converge on a commonly
shared defense posture in the face of Russian pressure,
intimidation, and coercion.
The first section of this monograph defines deterrence as a defense concept. NATO as a security structure with the activities that go with it is introduced
in an appropriate context. The European Union (EU)
has a minor role to play in military defense and is
only addressed when relevant. In the second section,
the security and defense policies of the three Nordic
countries are introduced and analyzed in greater
detail. Denmark is addressed only occasionally, as it
expresses its defense commitments primarily through
NATO and has distanced itself from Nordic-Baltic military cooperation. Russian military might is addressed
in the third section, followed by a brief review of the
defense aspects of the Baltics in the fourth section.
The Baltic States are addressed only briefly, given the
abundance of research produced on their affairs by
other reputable institutions. However, since NATO
could be the most prominent lead actor for promoting deeper cooperation and a further convergence of
defense postures, quantitative levels of allied capabilities available to deter Russia and change the strategic
calculus are provided.
These sections set the scene for options for
enhanced deterrence that are possible within the cooperation structures that already exist, with the support
of U.S. Army activities. An illustrative division of
shared responsibilities among the actors and its limitations is provided in the fifth section. This section
is followed by conclusions and recommendations for

4

the ongoing alignment of defense postures, bringing
the Nordic and Baltic countries, as well as the United
States, closer together. This section also discusses
the role the U.S. Army should play in Nordic-Baltic
defense and security to ensure deterrence.
The focus of this monograph excludes areas that do
not directly fall within the purview of the U.S. Army.4
This research seeks to contribute to the U.S. Army’s
understanding of the pros and cons of cooperation in
the Nordic-Baltic region.
DETERRENCE AND MULTINATIONAL ACTORS
IN THE NORDIC-BALTIC REGION
The focus on expeditionary capabilities for out-ofarea operations, a core function of NATO established
after the end of the Cold War, is today widely regarded
as obsolete. The emerging defense posture shared by
every state in the region is territorial defense. For all
but two nations, Finland and Russia, this has meant a
paradigm shift is changing the focus of defense postures back to territorial defense from expeditionary
and out-of-area operations.5 In the case of Sweden,
this shift in defense posture began as late as 2015.
For Finland and Russia, no comparable change took
place―only reductions in the size of forces, together
with some modernization. Russia’s military capabilities have recently substantially increased despite the
military being smaller than it was during the Soviet
and post-Soviet period. For NATO and allied nations,
a focus on territorial defense is forming. However,
maintaining a visible and robust military presence in
the region to strengthen the credibility of deterrence
policy while transforming and restoring member-state
and allied capabilities is of paramount importance. In
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the short term, more exercises and further cooperation
would help achieve the aim of a more credible deterrence policy.
As a concept and a defense strategy, deterrence has
made a comeback―or perhaps it should be said it has
been rediscovered. Much of what was once considered basic knowledge regarding deterrence appears
to have been unlearned. Two decades of contracting
military capabilities in the West have reduced the
risks associated with land grabs for Russia, whether
those of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 or that of
Crimea in 2014; only since the latter incident has the
West seriously contemplated how to deter Russia.6
Deterrence is the act of discouraging an opponent
from undesirable behavior. Deterrence can be achieved
by creating conditions in which the opponent cannot
achieve its war aims or threaten retaliation. In short,
there are two ways to establish a functioning and credible deterrent. First, one’s territory can be defended,
provided one’s military capabilities are enough to
prevent the aggressor from achieving its goals (deterrence by denial). Second, a defender’s capabilities
can be strengthened in a way that makes the consequences of aggression too costly for the aggressor after
the fact (deterrence by punishment). In other words,
the aggressor may achieve territorial gains, but at an
unjustifiable price. The most robust deterrence policy
combines elements of both approaches.7
This simplistic definition often encourages the
view that all it takes to deter is to put sufficient force
on display. If both sides act “rationally” (i.e., according to a shared cost-benefit calculus) and consent to
deterrence, and neither is suicidal, their military capabilities and the costs associated with those capabilities’
deployment will keep each other in check. To succeed,
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a strategy of deterrence must have three elements
in place: capabilities that are visible to the enemy; a
stated and credible commitment to responding to
aggression; and, clear communication with the enemy
so that it is aware of both of the above elements.
However, history offers many examples of failed
deterrence―even in cases featuring a military balance favorable to the victim. Sometimes, the weaker
side has counted on the element of surprise. This was
the case with the Japanese attack on the Pearl Harbor
Naval Base, which the Japanese hoped would destroy
much of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and paralyze political
decision-making. In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked
the militarily superior Israel, seeking to restore the
geopolitical strength they had lost in the 1967 SixDay War. Israel did not see the attack coming because
it regarded its adversaries as inferior and its military strength as overwhelming. Consequently, Israel
simply ignored the signs of an impending attack.
Israel’s military superiority failed to deter its enemies.8
The power of deterrence is predicated on all parties
thinking and behaving rationally within a shared normative framework. When such a framework is tenuous
or simply non-existent―as is the case when dealing
with extremists, insurgents, or terrorists―deterrence
may fail. In the Falklands War, when the United
Kingdom (UK) undertook a large-scale counteroffensive against Argentinean forces to retake an occupied
group of islands in 1982, the Argentinean leadership’s
rationale was based on two considerations. First, the
UK had severely reduced its military presence on the
islands, calling into question British resolve in the
event of an Argentinian takeover. Second, the Argentinean Government was in the middle of a severe
domestic crisis and at risk of losing power. To avert
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collapse, it constructed narratives inflaming patriotic fervor, boosting popular support in the process,
while setting in motion a series of events that forced
it to occupy the islands. That act of aggression was
about avoiding the loss of power, not winning territory―an insecurity that drove the Argentinean leadership to accept considerable risks.9 The lessons of 1982
are worth reconsidering in light of Russian or Turkish
domestic politics today: stirring nationalism to generate political support may lead to self-defeating military adventures.10
Deterrence is not only about a military balance
but also about interests. If the aggressor’s interest in
achieving a certain objective is greater than one’s own,
deterrence may fail, as happened in the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962. When it became clear that Washington
was ready to defend its core security interests, the
Soviet Union withdrew the missiles it had started to
deploy in Cuba. During the Vietnam War, the United
States was the militarily superior of the two belligerents, but, in the end, it withdrew its troops because the
North Vietnamese were willing to make much greater
sacrifices to achieve their goals than the United States
was in support of South Vietnam. This asymmetry not
only dooms deterrence but also makes great powers
lose small wars.11 This could bear relevance today in
the Baltic Sea region, given the military imbalance that
emerges when comparing Russian capabilities with
those of other states. An additional and often overlooked contribution to deterrence against a post-conflict occupation is a well-prepared resistance structure,
encompassing remnants of the defeated army as well
as irregular forces. One historical example was a
Finnish clandestine operation that saw weapons and
other equipment hidden in an attempt to establish a
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30-battalion-strong resistance force, to be activated in
the event of a military occupation.12 In a contemporary
parallel, NATO is currently signaling to Russia that
clandestine resistance and stay-behind forces akin to
the “Forest Brothers” of the last century are planned
for the Baltic States to help dissuade Russia from contemplating military occupation.13 In this case, as in the
historical case, the commitment is visible, and a clear
signal of preparedness is being sent.
The ultimate deterrence effect is based on a nuclear
arsenal. For the time being, the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons has sufficed to ensure
the success of nuclear deterrence. When a nation’s
existence is at stake, the use of nuclear weapons constitutes a credible threat and consequently deters
external aggression. However, there is a grave asymmetry between Russian and American perspectives
on the use of nuclear weapons. Russia is prepared to
deploy small-yield nuclear devices in the early stages
of a crisis.14 The United States enjoys far less flexibility
when it comes to the deployment of its nuclear arsenal, which consists almost entirely of strategic nuclear
devices and is managed through the nuclear triad. The
U.S. Air Force, for instance, possesses only a small
number of non-strategic nuclear armaments.15 In practice, the forward-deployed nuclear weapons located
in Europe are at present largely symbolic, and their
inclusion in real operational plans is questionable, as
their aerial delivery systems lack stealth and penetration capability. This will remain the case until more
capable strike fighters are introduced in the 2020s.
Unlike Russia, the United States and NATO view the
use of tactical nuclear weapons as a last resort.
Since NATO’s establishment, observers have
repeatedly speculated as to whether the United States
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would be willing to risk nuclear escalation to protect
an ally. One of the main challenges has been how
to convince the Soviet Union that the United States
would sacrifice itself to defend western Europe from
Soviet aggression.16 The message to be conveyed if this
is to succeed is that Washington views the security
of its allies as its own fundamental national security
interest―that the security of one allied nation is part of
the security of all allied nations.
Since the occupation of Crimea in 2014, Russia
and U.S. allies alike have similarly speculated on the
depth of the U.S. commitment to defending the Baltic
States. As a response, NATO leaders have deployed
multinational units to reassure their Baltic allies, but
also to make burden sharing fairer. Consequently, the
multinational military presence of one brigade-sized
and four battalion-sized units in the region, among
other capabilities, is probably regarded as convincing by Russia, especially when augmented by constant redeployments and large-scale exercises.17 Russia
apparently considers NATO’s moves as a means of
mitigating Russia’s overwhelming local superiority
and acts accordingly. Large-scale Russian exercises
prompt further temporary increases in deployments
to the front-line states, as with the case of Zapad in
September 2017, where a lack of Russian transparency fueled speculation over the likely outcome of the
exercise.18
After a relative absence of 2 decades, European
geographical constants have returned to the fore in
NATO planning. Persistent objective factors that
already pertained in the Cold War have combined
with new technologies, such as long-range and precision weapons systems. The Russian military build-up
in the Western Military District (MD), including the
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Northern Fleet in the Kola Peninsula, has been the
most important and powerful concentration of capabilities in Russia.19 In 2014, the Northern Fleet was
hived off from the Western MD to form the Northern
Joint Strategic Command (JSC), emphasizing the strategic importance of Russia’s Far North.20 Similarly, the
economic, industrial, and political center that is the
Saint Petersburg area is of existential importance for
Russia. This is emphasized by the military build-up in
the Kaliningrad exclave, situated between Lithuania
and Poland, and regarded as a forward-based defensive outpost of Saint Petersburg itself.21
From a Euro-Atlantic viewpoint, the military concentration in the Kola area is of existential importance
for Russia and vital for the United States to contain.
Today, the potential use of the Greenland, Iceland,
and UK passage, the final barrier keeping the Russian Navy from accessing the Atlantic Ocean and thus
endangering support for Europe during a crisis or in
wartime, has become a subject of interest once again.22
Of all Nordic states, Norway has played the most significant role in this respect, with its strong navy safeguarding lines of communication between continental
Europe and North America. The importance of these
capabilities and prepositioned assets in Norway is
also under re-evaluation, with modernization underway, after the post-Cold War closure of most local
bases and depots.
NATO as a Security Actor in the Region
Since 1994, when NATO established its PfP program, cooperation among the countries of northern Europe has increased significantly. Finland and
Sweden have benefited greatly from PfP cooperation
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through inter alia, standardization, military planning,
education, training, and exercises. To date, a great
number of evolutionary programs for cooperation are
ongoing, and many have been fully implemented.23
NATO has responded to the regional military
imbalance by emphasizing operational planning, elevating readiness, and increasing military presence.
These steps have translated into the drafting of new
defense plans for the eastern member states of NATO,
the rotating of military units, the updating of rapid
response capabilities with higher readiness in mind,
and the establishment of an assurance policy. Furthermore, cooperation with the Nordic partners, Finland
and Sweden, is enhanced through decision-making
exercises, elevated situational awareness, and host
nation support (HNS) arrangements, as well as cooperation within key NATO institutions. In this context,
the concept and capabilities of the NATO Response
Force (NRF) have been updated to meet higher readiness, larger capacity, and enhanced capability requirements in accordance with decisions made at the Wales
Summit.24
NATO has also strengthened its command structure in various ways. New cooperation arrangements
are in force at NATO’s multinational headquarters in
Szczecin, Poland. This headquarters is responsible for
planning in the Baltic Sea region and is, exceptionally,
in permanent readiness. Finnish and Swedish military officers are present in most of the headquarters
that pertain to the region. NATO has deployed four
multinational battle groups to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, with contributions from 17 allied
countries, increasing deterrence by visibly strengthening the transatlantic bond. Furthermore, air policing
has been stepped up over the Baltic and Black Seas,
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in addition to four force integration units in the Baltic
Sea region and a multinational brigade to be deployed
in Romania.
The more than 100 military exercises conducted
by NATO annually together with some 150 national
exercises associated with the Alliance are an important element of readiness. In late 2018, Norway hosted
the Trident Juncture high-visibility exercise with the
goal of testing how NATO would reinforce Norway in
a crisis or war and how Norway would manage HNS
and logistics support for allied forces in turn. The main
element to be tested for NATO was the NRF and its
spearhead unit―the Very High Readiness Joint Task
Force―when defending allied territory. For Norway,
its entire national defense system was to be tested in
an Article 5 situation. Finland participated with 2,400
soldiers from all three services. Sweden provided a
framework brigade operating in both Finnish and
Swedish territory. Nordic aircraft operated together
in all three Nordic countries. Altogether, about 50,000
soldiers from 31 countries took part in the exercise;
consequently, the Organization for Security and
Co-operation was informed, and its member states
were invited to send observers. Russia was informed
about the exercise and its defensive nature, and was
also invited as an observer.25
These exercises have ensured that NATO’s comprehensive system has been adapted to an elevated
state of readiness along with testing necessary HNS
arrangements for a successful exercise.26 At the political level, decision-making rehearsals (e.g., Crisis Management Exercises) are organized to improve dialogue,
consultations, and leadership. At the military level,
these demands are addressed through enhanced NRF
exercises. In recent years, both Nordic partners have

13

regularly been participating, as they are quite often
invited at the earliest stages of planning. Since the
Warsaw Summit, these exercises have been organized
in parallel and in coordination with the EU to improve
the synchronization of crisis response activities.
Since NATO’s Wales Summit in September 2014,
all Western countries of the region have taken additional steps to deepen military cooperation. Offering
the status of Enhanced Opportunities, NATO invited
both Nordic partners to engage in closer and earlier
planning of more demanding exercises (e.g., enhanced
NRF) and related preparatory activities (e.g., HNS).
In terms of reciprocity, the Nordic partners, Finland
and Sweden, have been involved in evaluations of the
Baltic Sea security situation based on deeper information exchange.27
Key takeaways from the Warsaw Summit in July
2016 indicated that there are opportunities for more
extensive and deeper cooperation open to the Nordic
partners. In general, the development of capabilities
will be accelerated not only in magnitude but also by
focusing more precisely on collective defense instead
of crisis response operations. This collective defense,
in turn, requires enhanced cooperation pertaining to
situational analysis and operational planning, which,
among other things, will indicate what type of capabilities will be needed in the future.
The new activities of NATO have had a stabilizing influence in the region. This view is widely shared
between both the allied and Nordic governments of
the region. From Finland’s point of view, a dual-track
approach, strengthening both defense and deterrence
while continuing an appropriate dialogue with Russia,
is preferred. In fact, NATO has left the door open for
dialogue with Russia.28
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The EU as a Security Actor in the Region
All Western states around the Baltic Sea are members of the EU, which could represent an alternative
avenue for enhanced security and defense cooperation. In practice, this has developed not according to
the wishes of Finland (i.e., toward shared European
defense); on the contrary, it has developed more
according to Swedish attitudes emphasizing sovereignty. The Commission, the executive body of the EU,
has no authority regarding military defense, which is
unambiguously the responsibility of member states.
Member states have not addressed common defense
as an optional end-state for the EU. However, Article
42 of the Lisbon Treaty provides a legal basis for ad
hoc measures in a situation where no other actor, such
as NATO or the United States, is available to defend
the EU and its member states.29
Currently, both Nordic partners remain outside
NATO, commonly regarded as the ultimate guarantor of “hard” security. In December 2016, the European Council, the highest decision-making body of the
EU, stated a higher level of military ambition, but no
conceptual change or paradigm shift toward real military defense capabilities was discussed or reiterated.
Despite diverse views on EU security and defense
policy priorities, current proposals could help some
member states coordinate, jointly finance through
a common defense fund, and even procure defense
materiel more efficiently. Similarly, the relaunch of the
Permanent Structured Cooperation by the participating EU member states aims at enhanced capabilities
for out-of-area crisis management activities, but not
territorial defense as such. Another promising project
for the EU and NATO is known as military mobility
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(or “military Schengen,” after the Schengen area of
the EU), which would improve logistics, legislation,
and infrastructure for civilian and military purposes
and be financially supported by the Commission. In
the EU context, three related initiatives for expanding
multinational cooperation among selected member
states are in the making: the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), already operational; the German-led
Framework Nation Concept; and, the French-led European Intervention Initiative. Both Finland and Sweden
are taking part in the first two initiatives, and Finland in all three.30 Furthermore, opportunities to promote transatlantic burden-sharing could be realized
through multi-speed European defense collaboration.
The current division between eastern and southern
EU member states could also deepen.31
In light of the March 2017 Rome declarations, at
least some potential for progress exists based on a
step-by-step approach. In the future, the EU could
also best serve the common interests of its members
through enhanced external civil-military crisis management activities and resilience; and, furthermore,
by building the civil capabilities of its partners and
providing civil resilience support to EU citizens. Both
Finland and Sweden, however, regard the EU as the
primary foreign policy arena for the promotion of
security and both Nordic countries support cooperation between the EU and NATO.32
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NORDIC DEFENSE SOLUTIONS
IN TRANSITION
All of the Nordic states addressed in this monograph share a common history as part of the Swedish empire. To a significant degree, this accounts for
numerous similarities among the three countries’ governments, cultures, and societies. They are regularly
featured in lists of the world’s top 10 states in the categories of welfare, democracy, human rights, the rule
of law, equality, education, transparency, and more.
History has deeply shaped the national identities of all four Nordic nations (including Denmark).
Norway and Denmark were both rapidly occupied
by Nazi Germany in early 1940 and liberated only in
1945. Finland and Sweden have never been occupied
by a foreign state, but wartime experiences informed
their conduct during the Cold War. Finland’s neutrality could be described as externally imposed and
stemming from an ambiguous political-military agreement with the Soviet Union―the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Sweden’s
neutrality, on the other hand, is understood to be an
independent choice, notwithstanding that country’s
close cooperation first with Nazi Germany in World
War II, and later in secrecy with the United States, the
UK, and Nordic NATO member states throughout
the Cold War.33 The tradition of more than 200 years
of neutrality remains a prominent factor in Swedish
policymaking.
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Norway―Collective and National Duties
Situation and Challenges
Norway maintains small yet well-equipped and
highly trained armed forces. As a NATO member state,
it strictly observes collective responsibilities together
with paying close attention to territorial defense issues.
Norway’s focus on its “High North” has grown, given
its relationship with Russia. Norway, which does not
regard Russia as an acute military threat, upheld good
working relations with the Soviet Union, and upholds
good working relations with Russia, based on a dualtrack strategy of deterrence (avskrekkning) and reassurance (beroligelse), signaling no hostile intent. The
combination of Russia’s military modernization and
its will to exert military power informs the Russian
Federation’s designation as a central factor in Norwegian defense planning.34
Areas in Norway’s immediate vicinity are also central to Russian nuclear deterrence, while recent years
have seen Russia’s military presence and activities in
the High North increase. Exceptionally, given recent
European security developments, the High North is
predominantly characterized by stability and cooperation. Furthermore, Russian strategies for the Arctic
still emphasize international cooperation, rather than
competition or rivalry, in the post-Cold War world.
Nonetheless, Russia has pursued a vigorous remilitarization of the Arctic in recent years. Norway is not
ruling out the possibility that Russia will consider
using military force in the High North should it find
itself in a conflict situation. In fact, the high-level military believes it is likely that Russian defensive action
would include a limited ground operation against
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Norway’s northeastern region in order to reduce the
risk of land-based threats to Russian bases in the Kola
Peninsula.35 This defensive action would obviously
affect both Finland and Sweden.
More broadly, this can also be seen in the Baltic
area, where the result has been Norwegian leadership’s additional attention to the area. This focus
indicates a new Norwegian approach involving the
political will and military ability to provide units to
the Baltic States for combat and protracted crises. In
essence, the message is that the collective deterrent
effect must be impressive enough on all fronts, not just
in the High North.36
Norway recognizes that long-term challenges
are not fully addressed by current plans for resisting
external risks to its sovereignty and rights. It regards
its responsibilities toward NATO as largely limited to
the maritime domain, where Norway is chiefly responsible for surveillance, observation, and the identification of potential adversaries and their assets. Norway
intends to take maximum advantage of the advanced
weapons and technologies available to it. However,
the proliferation of advanced technologies represents
a dual challenge.
On the one hand, these have an impact on the
region’s threat environment, with the use of enhanced,
long-range and high-precision weapons translating into, among other things, a short warning time.
Modern missile and surveillance systems are developed in order to deny access to, or restrict freedom
of movement inside, certain areas or spaces (a concept referred to as anti-access/area denial), but they
can also be challenged with new long-range missiles,
stealth, and other technologies, with the aim of degrading the performance of enemy systems in combat.37
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New capabilities in the cyber and space domains pose
an evolving threat against, among other targets, command, control, and communications systems.
On the other hand, these technological advancements require continuing the modernization of even
small armed forces. While new equipment represents
a qualitative improvement over outdated systems
and platforms, it also costs more to acquire, maintain, and operate. Like other states of a similar size,
Norway accepts that increasing costs can no longer
be addressed simply by downscaling capabilities or
through internal cuts.38
Priorities and Capabilities
The main priorities of Norwegian defense are
national defense, followed by the provision of a
NATO-led collective defense, international crisis
management, and the concept of total defense. These
priorities strongly indicate that national responsibilities, such as readiness, logistics, presence, manning
levels, and training, are paramount in relation to collective endeavors. The first three of the armed forces’
seven tasks address collective activities, such as deterrence and defense, prevention, and management. The
remaining tasks are related to national decision-making, sovereignty, multinational cooperation, public
security, and crisis management.
Norway’s authorities make it clear that enough
resources will be invested to allow full implementation. In this respect, strategic capabilities―namely,
intelligence, situational awareness, and fighting
power―are prioritized. A measured response against
any use of force is supported through NATO’s forward
presence. The role of the Norwegian armed forces in
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collective defense is to affect strategic decisions made
by a potential aggressor at a distance through detection and identification and to defeat appropriate targets in all situations. Norway, which is quite literally a
front-line state, has the crucial role of containing Russian encroachment on NATO’s area of responsibility.
Norway’s defense concept provides for two main
elements: national capabilities enabling Norway to
respond in the early stages of a crisis and allied reinforcements arriving before the crisis escalates. To operationalize both elements seamlessly requires, among
other things, a functioning HNS system and the ability to mobilize national resources on time. It is vital
that an allied presence in Norway be sufficiently visible to strengthen the credibility of deterrence policy,
even though there can be no permanent presence in
peacetime.
In practice, the U.S. Marine Corps Prepositioning
Program in central Norway facilitates operational
capabilities for, among others, a high-readiness force
consisting of an infantry battalion task force, combat
logistics battalion, and composite aviation squadron.
Interoperability and compatibility among allied forces
are fostered in peacetime through standardized procurement, multinational exercises, and training events.
HNS for such activities, together with full readiness to
receive allied reinforcements, remains a precondition
for a robust defense posture. The national capacity
to resist an armed attack and to respond to aggression promptly, whatever its form, has been emphasized recently in Norway; however, this must be done
independently from any NATO or allied actions. The
system of conscription serves this goal, with onethird of eligible conscripts completing national service
annually (8,000-9,000), adding up to a wartime pool
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of approximately 60,000. Of these 60,000, some 45,000
belong to the Home Guard. The rest are professional
soldiers.39
The strategic capabilities to be acquired include
four strands. The first is a fleet of 52 F-35 Lightning II
aircraft with an appropriate weapons suite, such as the
Norwegian-developed Joint Strike Missile. Replacements of submarines and maritime patrol aircraft represent capabilities with a strategic reach. The fourth
strand is Norway’s ground-based air defense, with the
current medium-range National Advanced Surfaceto-Air Missile System-2, which will be upgraded and
equipped with additional extended-range missiles. A
new air defense system with long-range missiles and
sensors will also be introduced. Ground-based air
defense systems will be concentrated around the two
air bases and around potential staging areas for allied
reinforcements. All of this is reflected in the investment program. However, several smaller projects will
also be implemented to modernize the overall joint
force.
A government report detailing Norwegian defense
acquisition plans was published in early 2018.40 Further investments are needed, especially in intelligence,
surveillance, survivability, and combat power, in order
to strengthen Norway’s and NATO’s ability to prevent
and deter the use of force. These changes will contribute to bolstering the overall deterrence policy of both
Norway and the Alliance. Materiel maintenance, deficits, and stocks will be made good and increased activity levels in all services reached from 2018 onward,
followed by a focus on new capabilities strengthening
defense and situational awareness in the High North.
The deployment from January 2017 onward of a 300strong U.S. Marine Corps contingent to Vaernes and
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Setermoen could serve as an opportunity not only for
enhanced cooperation but also to strengthen the overall deterrent effect. Currently, there is one set of field
artillery battalion equipment held in storage by U.S.
European Command.41
The defense concept focuses on the northern half
of the country and the High North. The army and the
Home Guard, together with the Coastal and Special
Forces, will enhance their focus on the High North,
while the other two services retain their modus operandi with their modernized and incoming strategic
capabilities. The government has requested a Landpower study (Landmaktproposisjonen) to review future
missions, concepts, and structures for the ground
forces.42 The premise is that modern Landpower has
proven its relevance and value in recent crisis management operations and war. The readiness and availability of current ground units, together with aging
equipment and systems, is also to be reviewed. This
review will organically lead to updated land warfare
concepts, force structures, basing systems, and training. Finally, the study is to be embedded into the
common education and training system of the Norwegian armed forces.43
Operational Issues
The army, located primarily in the northern half
of the country, consists of one brigade headquarters and three battalions, together with six to seven
battalion-size support units and the Border Guard.
The navy has 5 frigates, 6 corvettes, 6 submarines, 6
mine-countermeasure vessels, 13 coast guard vessels, and support vessels. The air force operates 57
upgraded F-16 fighters (planned to be replaced by
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52 F-35s), control and early warning systems, base
defense battle groups, ground-based air defense units,
4 tactical transport aircraft, 6 maritime patrol aircraft,
3 electronic warfare aircraft, and a total of 44 helicopters. The Home Guard, as a service, operates 10 territorial district staffs, a rapid reaction force (3,000
personnel), and regionally structured follow-on forces
(35,000 personnel). Special operations forces operate
under their own command.
Each main service shares integrated tactical command facilities and has a logistics base of its own. As
a new national defense tool, the Armed Forces Cyber
Defense supports the armed forces with establishing, operating, and protecting networks at home and
abroad. As one of the services, it is responsible for
defending military networks against cyberattacks as
well as developing network-based defense. Of the
main services, the army is least capable of responding
to probable ground-based threat scenarios. The Landpower study concludes that one brigade is insufficient
for deterrence purposes or for the army to be able to
repel offensive land units in the initial phase of a crisis
or a war. However, it was decided that Brigade Nord,
situated in central Norway, would continue as the
major contingent of the army.44
Finland: Searching for a Reliable and
Credible Partner
Situation and Challenges
During independent and sovereign Finland’s first
century of existence, it fought three wars against the
Soviet Union. History has had a strong impact on the
national identity of Finns, and is still visible in many
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ways―for instance, in strong support for a nationwide
defense concept and military non-alignment.45
As stated in the 2016 Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy, the primary areas for
improvement concerning Finland’s security include
influencing the operating environment; intensifying
foreign and security policy cooperation; preparing
for global risks; and, on the other hand, taking advantage of emerging trends. Russia’s illegal annexation of
Crimea and its continuing military actions in eastern
Ukraine constitute a major strategic shift and underline a great potential for rapid and unprecedented
changes in European security. The Finnish Government has declared that the use or threat of military
force against Finland cannot be ruled out and that it
will prepare itself for threats accordingly. The Finnish
model for comprehensive defense could be described
as a combination of deterrence, resilience, and defensive as well as offensive actions to constrain adversaries’ hybrid activities in all situations. From 2016
onward, defense budgets in absolute figures have seen
a 4 to 10-percent increase in funding.46
The two factors primarily affecting Finland’s geopolitical situation are the Kola Peninsula and Saint
Petersburg. The peninsula’s major military concentrations neighbor Finland, running along the northernmost one-third of the shared border, while the former
Russian capital is situated near the southernmost
parts of the country. The length of the shared border,
running between the two strategic areas, is 1,340
kilometers.47
In Finland, the geopolitical situation has been traditionally described as an equation consisting of two
factors: military capabilities and the political will to
use force. Military capabilities are measurable in both
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their quality and quantity, but they take decades to
strengthen. Political will, on the other hand, is difficult to evaluate or map, but could change overnight.
In simple geopolitical terms, Russia has emphasized
an “inherent right” to influence neighbors’ internal
affairs, just as the Soviet Union did. For the Nordic
countries, and particularly Finland as the host of the
1975 Helsinki Summit of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (now known as the Organization for Security and Co-operation) and a staunch
defender of the Helsinki Final Act, such an arrangement is unacceptable. Of all nonaligned neighbors of
European Russia, only Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Finland have not lost parts of their territory to Russia
since the end of the Cold War.
Geopolitical concepts such as spheres of influence
have reappeared in the political lexicon. One factor is
the Russian policy of protecting the interests of Russian nationals worldwide, reaffirmed since Russia’s
war against Georgia in 2008. Given that tens of thousands of Russians hold dual citizenship in Finland,
in addition to those with work permits and temporary visas, security-related concerns have been raised.
In recent years, Russian leadership has warned both
Finland and Sweden against joining NATO, lest this
should result in countermeasures. Sweden has mostly
ignored these threats, but, recently, Finnish leadership
has interpreted harsh Russian rhetoric as designating
Finland an “enemy” if it were to join NATO.48 However, in both countries, the notion of potential NATO
membership is gradually evolving, though not in
unison.
A major challenge for Finland’s defense is the constant lack of a reliable partner with whom to cooperate in the long term on in-depth military planning,
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preparations, and acquisitions, and on building a
common defense system resulting in a more credible
deterrence policy. Currently, Sweden is the principal
partner, followed by the United States, but the solidarity and assistance clauses in the Treaty of Lisbon
(Articles 222 and 42) make the EU another perceived
source of enhanced security, even defense. A sign of
this major challenge is Finland’s eagerness to proceed with, first, a reluctant Sweden, and, second, the
EU, using an even more ambitious interpretation
of defense in mind than what is stated in the Lisbon
Treaty.49 Finland has been preparing itself for providing and receiving assistance since the early 2000s by
improving national facilities and, more recently, by
modernizing legislation. Bilateral framework-type
agreements have been signed with Denmark, Estonia,
France, Germany, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the UK,
and the United States, for instance.
For the Finns, NATO membership is not at present
a popular prospect, and this motivates Finland’s political leadership to seek an alternative defense partner.
Public opinion almost unanimously supports military
cooperation with the Nordic countries, particularly
with Sweden. Similarly, cooperation with the EU is
supported by 87 percent, and with the United States
by 64 percent. Some 60 percent are in favor of military cooperation with NATO, something one-third of
Finns oppose. When asked whether NATO membership would increase or decrease Finland’s security, the
country is divided, with each option convincing onethird of Finns.50
Bilateral cooperation with Sweden is unbalanced
for historical and identity-related reasons, but also
because of differing ambitions. For Finland, cooperation should be wide-ranging, based on shared
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interests, and unlimited. Finland would prefer much
deeper defense cooperation, covering operational
planning for all situations, including the defense of
territorial integrity or the implementation of the inherent right to collective self-defense pursuant to Article
51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter. Establishing
the joint use of civilian and military resources is also
envisaged. For Sweden, two caveats apply: the planning should be complementary to, and separate from,
national defense planning, and no binding commitments are acceptable. This discrepancy exists, even
though, in a crisis, both states would probably be
dragged into the same conflict.51 The Swedish Government cherishes its freedom of action and is prepared
to rely more on ad hoc decision-making in acute crisis
situations.
Bilateral cooperation with the United States has
been a great success, particularly since the introduction of U.S. F-18 Hornet fighter aircraft in the
mid-1990s, through to the recent procurement of stateof-the-art air-to-ground low radar signature missiles
(Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile [JASSM]). After
reaching operational capability in May 2018, JASSM
has broadened the set of missions open to the Finnish
Air Force.52 Finland does not expect recent uncertainties about U.S. foreign policy toward Europe to affect
practical-level cooperation in the Baltic Sea region.
Finland appreciates regular political dialogue and
practical cooperation with NATO, which has been
based on mutually beneficial progress since 1994. Finland is an Enhanced Opportunities partner, together
with Sweden, and cooperation in various formats (e.g.,
28+2) is to be further enhanced in several areas.
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Priorities and Capabilities
As stated in Finland’s Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy, the country’s primary
aim is to avoid becoming a party to a military conflict.53 Despite the recent revival of power politics and
an intense state of uncertainty, Finland’s foreign and
security policy relies on global interdependence. For a
small country neighboring Russia, this is challenging
and demands strong cooperation with like-minded
actors. Interpretation of Finnish priorities is complicated because Finland is militarily nonaligned, but, in
practice, it is an embedded ally in political, economic,
and even military terms, given its EU membership
and observance of inherent solidarity clauses.
The Finnish Government’s Defence Report to Parliament, published in February 2017, contains the
defense policy guidelines for the maintenance, development, and utilization of Finland’s defense capabilities. The report was drawn up based on the previous
parliamentary and government reports, published in
2014 and 2016. These reports evaluate Finland’s operating environment and present focal points, policy
objectives, and guidance on defense issues.54
The report proceeds from the premise of a shorter
early-warning period for a military crisis and a lower
threshold for using force. It also promotes higher
readiness and the deepening of defense cooperation
as well as the development of related national legislation. Consequently, defense-related demands have
grown, and Finland must prepare for the use or threat
of military force against it.55
The services’ readiness, together with intelligence,
cyber defense, and long-range strike capabilities,
will be the subject of close attention. Naturally, the
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aim is also to replace outdated capabilities. With an
armed force that is overwhelmingly based on reservists, Finland’s full mobilization of wartime forces
requires supplementary materiel as well as additional
resources possessed by other authorities, nongovernmental organizations, public organizations, and commercial and private owners. For decades, this has been
enshrined in legislation providing for the total defense
concept: a comprehensive approach to homeland
defense.
Traditionally, these reports have been described
as threat based, with the exception of the 2015 report,
which explored the possibility of spending cuts (of
approximately 10 percent). The latest reports remedy
existing problems by raising total wartime strength by
20 percent and committing to increasing the defense
budget for readiness-related and acquisition reasons
(approximately 8-percent gradual growth). For the
two strategic projects’ acquisitions, it is estimated that
approximately US$1 billion will be added annually to
the current budget between 2019 and 2031.56
The current defense posture is based on sufficient national defense capabilities and capacity that
are meant to constitute a credible deterrence policy
encompassing the entire country (titled as “credible
national defense”). Currently, Finland possesses a
substantial number of trained combat units with the
required military structures and holistic systems as a
functioning defense system; this will continue to be
the case in the coming decade. Previously, the primary
deficit was an inadequate level of resources for training and exercises, but some improvement has taken
place since 2014.
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Operational Issues
The political requirement for the armed forces is
to defend all territory, including the Åland Islands,
which are demilitarized in peacetime, and the sparsely
populated northern half of the country. This has
resulted in a land-heavy defense system with 280,000strong armed forces (wartime strength) consisting
of, among others, 2 mechanized brigades, 3 infantry
brigades (jaeger), 6 light infantry brigades, 2 armored
regiments, 1 special operations battalion, and 1 helicopter battalion, together with 12 combat support and
combat service support units. Currently, the navy
and its navy command operate the Coastal Fleet, possessing 8 missile vessels, 5 minelayers, and 10 minecountermeasure vessels. For coastal defense, the
Coastal Brigade (amphibious) focuses on conscript
training, maritime surveillance, and special operations. The Nyland Brigade yields mobile coastal jaeger
and combat support units. There are also capabilities
for service support and transport tasks. The air force
has 2 operational fighter aircraft wings with 62 F/A-18
C/D Hornet aircraft and 1 unit for reconnaissance,
training, and transport, supported by 4 main air bases
and surveillance systems.57
Following the 2017 Defence Report, the maximum
wartime strength was expanded to 280,000 soldiers
by adding, among others, existing mobilization organizations, trained conscripts, and some of the Border
Guard’s units, should they become necessary in a time
of crisis. Several steps have already been taken to elevate readiness in all peacetime army units covering all
parts of the country.58
While Finland’s population is only five-and-a-half
million, its territory is the seventh largest in Europe,
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and its formal status of military non-alignment in
addition to its shared border with a currently assertive
Russia warrants its system of compulsory conscription, which facilitates the wartime mobilization of a
sufficient number of units. Consequently, the defense
structure in peacetime is designed primarily for training conscripts and thus preparing wartime units.59
The conscription system is widely and strongly supported by citizens, with approximately 80 percent in
favor. This system provides the majority of personnel
for units and systems (an estimated 95 percent). However, professional staffing maintains the air force and
the navy in a permanent state of high readiness so that
it is ready to react to any potential violation of territorial integrity.
The major challenge for the Finnish Defense Forces
stems from deficits in materiel, both in quality and
quantity. This deficit resulted from a sustained period
of reduced funding, which led to the reallocation of
funds from procurement of materiel to operational
costs. Since late 2016, this trend has been reversed and
funding has increased, if only modestly. For instance,
the army will receive additional funds for training and
the achievement of higher readiness. Additionally, the
majority of cuts to the defense budget overseen by the
previous government will be revoked. Approximately
US$3 billion for army materiel procurement impacting
mobility, readiness, and fighting power, among other
things, has been earmarked for the 2020s. In previous
years, however, the overall situation with materiel
budgets hit the army hard.60
The second challenge is a new consideration following Russia’s land grab in Ukraine―namely, army
units’ readiness for a surprise attack. While readiness
is improving, Russia’s dual-capable precision strike
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systems, such as ballistic and cruise missile systems,
have been deployed within striking distance of Finland and most countries in the Nordic-Baltic region.61
New capabilities are needed to counter missile attacks
because the current air defense system cannot prevent
them. Missile defense assets, however important, are
unfortunately not regarded as affordable for Finland.
Hybrid warfare capabilities have also become a
prominent element in threat scenarios, further adding
to the demands made of Finland’s deterrence policy.
In this respect, and as the third challenge, the national
mobilization system is most vulnerable in the earliest
phases of a crisis, an issue that has always been recognized. The major issue is making the decision to
launch initial and vital activities initiating mobilization. These immediate activities can be commenced
autonomously by the military or civilian authorities
responsible, but later must be approved by Parliament. High-level exercises (or wargaming) to ensure
preparedness for challenges in various crisis situations
would alleviate the risks of delayed political decision-making and contribute to the credibility of the
deterrence policy.
The tactical and operational levels of war, together
with cold weather conditions that can be taken advantage of, are still a specific area of expertise nurtured
by the military. Commanding brigade-size and larger
units in exercises has been neglected for some years
but has recently returned to the curriculum.
The defense concept and the defense system are
both national and not integrated with NATO or allied
defense systems in any way. This contributes to credibility but restricts the potential of foreign military
assistance. Whether this would add to, or detract from,
national security is not the topic of this report, though

33

it warrants further examination. Nevertheless, major
parts of the Finnish armed forces, especially operational navy and air force units, are trained to meet
most NATO interoperability requirements. All the
units that were declared available for crisis response
operations, NATO-led or otherwise, have already met
the evaluation requirements of NATO standards. In
many areas, the same requirements inform the training
curriculum of units designated for national defense.
Like Norway, Finland has decided to promote
strategic capabilities above others. The Defence Report
ensures progress with the planned replacement of
Rauma-class missile vessels and Hämeenmaa-class
minelayers, together with the modernization of aging
Hamina-class missile vessels. With four operational
vessels, the current capabilities will be maintained
in all seasons and weather conditions. The costs are
estimated to total US$1.4 billion. The F/A-18 Hornet
aircraft will come to the end of their life cycle in 20252030, but there is a political consensus to ensure that
their capabilities will be replaced in full. Procurement
expenses are expected to total US$7 billion to US$10
billion. The potential for additional air defense capabilities will be assessed before deciding on the type
and equipment of new aircraft.62
Sweden: Defense in Continuous Transition
Situation and Challenges
The deteriorating security situation in Sweden’s
vicinity has resulted in a drastic change in Swedish security policy, necessitating the prioritization
of national defense and domestic readiness in addition to the downscaling of international missions.
In and around the Nordic-Baltic region, Sweden is
geographically central, while Norway and Finland
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are situated further to the north and east. Southern
Sweden, together with Gotland and Öland, are only
some 300 kilometers away from the Russian exclave of
Kaliningrad, directly across the Baltic Sea. For Russia,
southern Sweden represents a direct route to the heartland of Europe―and, consequently, of NATO.
Geographically, southern Sweden is linked to the
Baltic States, Poland, Denmark, and Germany. For
Finland, this is not the case. Southern Finland’s neighbors are Estonia to the south and Saint Petersburg
to the east. The Kola Peninsula connects Finland to
NATO member states Norway, Iceland, and the UK,
and, more remotely, the Greenland, Iceland, and UK
passage. In other words, Finland and Sweden share
a common geopolitical situation with NATO and
the allied nations of the region, but not their responsibilities. The combination of Norway, Finland, and
Sweden is often seen as one group of countries with
many similarities.
Sweden has enjoyed neutrality, or military
non-alignment, for the last two centuries.63 Its legacy
of neutrality has permeated national identity. However, enhanced security cooperation within the EU—
the United States and NATO, among others—enjoys
strong popular support. Sweden has managed to
influence its security environment through its political, economic, and cultural strength as well as through
secret military cooperation with leading allied nations
during the Cold War.64 Today, with its central location, its heritage as a regional leader, and its national
resources, Sweden is well positioned to influence the
region.
For Sweden, the main challenge is its insufficient
defense capabilities.65 Swedish defense reforms in 2004
were based on the changing security environment,
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emphasizing new threats, such as ethnic cleansing,
failed states, genocide, terrorism, and the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. Positive prospects
suggesting a more democratic and liberal society in
Russia, together with the accession of the Baltic States
and eastern European countries to NATO and the EU,
inclined Swedish policymakers to expect a more peaceful and stable coexistence. Territorial defense planning
was suspended and the island of Gotland, situated
in the middle of the Baltic Sea and facing the Kaliningrad exclave, was demilitarized. Many innovative
solutions were abandoned due to this paradigm shift,
with a network consisting of dozens of dispersed road
bases for aircraft dismantled. Gradual defense reform
drastically reduced the resources of the military, such
as wartime strength, which fell from 800,000 to 50,000
personnel during 1990-2015. Cuts meant the reallocation of resources to modernization of hardware and
making training and exercises more effective.66
For the military, a revolutionary change was
needed, from the former reservist-based defense
system, designed to repel large-scale offensives, to
something more applicable to new threats. Internationalization and multinational cooperation were necessary for not only reform but also for strengthening
the idea of a solidarity-based, common EU defense.
In the long term, PfP was the main vehicle for this
transformation, but in the short term, Sweden focused
on the EU’s Battle Group concept (EUBG). Sweden
assumed the lead nation responsibilities of the EUBG
through three Nordic Battle Groups (NBGs) in 2008,
2011, and 2015. As part of defense reform, almost all
Swedish peacetime garrisons, or regiments, were
transformed through this process, resulting in a
battalion-sized contribution to the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan.67
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Currently, Sweden assumes that it can defend one
of the five strategic areas (Stockholm, Gotland, Malmö,
Gothenburg, and Boden) for a week before foreign
military assistance and support become necessary.68
The existing set of crisis management capabilities is
regarded as inadequate by Sweden’s current leaders
as well as by the opposition. This viewpoint is clearly
reflected in the security policy doctrine, referred to as
“the solidarity security policy” (“Den solidariska säker
hetspolitiken”). Thus, cooperation with NATO and
Nordic countries has grown far more important.69
In early 2014, after the wake-up call of the
Ukrainian crisis, the Swedish Defense Bill for 20162020 was finalized. It increases the budget, raises the
level of readiness, and facilitates more training exercises of higher quality and on a larger scale. Swedish
defense expenditure has dropped more than twofold in 30 years, to 1 percent from the previous level
of 2.5 percent.70 Fully equipping the country’s armed
forces would require substantial additional resources
to make the new defense organization fully ready by
2023. An extra challenge is the magnitude of unfunded
projects in the ongoing defense reform, worth some
US$5 billion and increasing in cost by several hundred
million dollars annually. The Swedish Government
began to address the deficit in March 2017, albeit committing only US$50 million. Prior to the parliamentary elections of September 2018, virtually all political
parties were willing to raise the budget from the total
agreed upon, US$5 billion in 2020, to US$6.5 billion in
2021. Furthermore, an expansion of the conscript service from the current number of 4,000 personnel to
8,000 personnel is planned for the 2020s to make the
defense system more robust.71

37

Cooperation with Finland has already started to
increase and could be expanded to include common
operational planning and preparations for the potential use of civilian and military capabilities in various scenarios.72 The bill refers to various scenarios
for bilateral cooperation in cases involving the violation of territorial integrity and the use of force based
on Article 51 of the UN Charter. To date, for Sweden,
as mentioned earlier, this planning can only be complementary to national duties, and no binding commitments are acceptable―contrary to Finnish policy,
which states that no restrictions apply. In 2018, new
targets were agreed on with the aim of creating prerequisites for combined, joint military action and operations in all situations. For instance, operational and
tactical planning, procedures for the transfer of operational command and control authority, as well as HNS
in the context of territorial surveillance and protection
of territorial integrity are listed in the new memorandum of understanding. However, it does not contain
mutual defense obligations, and the execution of bilateral military action and operations is subject to separate national decisions. One rationale behind progress
is the shared assumption that if a crisis disrupts the
region, both countries will probably be dragged into
the conflict.73
Geographical facts motivate cooperation with the
United States, too. The latest example, the trilateral
Statement of Intent (among the United States, Sweden,
and Finland) to promote regional security and stability, is a significant step forward. It aims at stronger dialogue, wider exchange of information, and
strengthened military capabilities through enhanced
trilateral training and exercises, while promoting
cooperation between the EU and NATO. In Sweden,
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public opinion has traditionally counted on effective
military assistance (31 percent in 2011), but recent
figures indicate a clear decline (15 percent in 2017).74
Sweden elevates national and collective deterrence to
preserve stability in its territory, and the United States
and Finland have a significant role to play in this
effort.75
Priorities and Capabilities
Because of the deteriorating security environment,
Sweden has decided to recalibrate its defense posture
toward deterring the violation of territorial integrity
and achieving a threshold effect (skapa tröskeleffekt),
thus approaching the traditional Finnish defense paradigm (deterrence by denial). Evidently, the Swedish armed forces need larger operational army units
to achieve greater operational flexibility and freedom of movement, both of which are essential for the
defense of more than a handful of strategic areas. One
way to improve this flexibility and freedom of movement is to reintroduce conscription in peacetime to
make recruiting more effective and enlarge reserves.
This congruence of territorial defense could lower the
threshold of deeper defense cooperation even further
between the two militarily nonaligned neighbors. One
difference, however, is that Sweden expects others to
find it in their interest to provide military support and
assistance soon after a crisis has erupted―the Swedish-led Aurora 17 major exercise with the participation
of almost 1,500 U.S. soldiers is a case in point.76 In contrast, Finland relies on its military, national defense
capacities, and preparations to respond to crises. The
principle of solidarity is embedded into Swedish security and defense policy and, thus, Sweden pledges not
to remain passive if another EU member state or Baltic
or Nordic state finds itself under attack.77
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Sweden has promoted solidarity in the context of
the EU, but also within the Nordic-Baltic region. Solidarity as a security concept is a two-way street: one
must be capable of receiving external support and
open to providing support for others. The principle
of solidarity is based on mutual confidence, trust, and
reciprocity. Solidarity also indicates that cooperation
is based on long-term relations. In the current security situation, regardless of some high-tech capabilities―such as Meteor long-range air-to-air missiles,
Patriot (PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement) missile/air-defense systems pending U.S. acceptance,
and Iris-T dual-purpose air-to-air and air defense missiles―Sweden does not possess sufficiently credible
capabilities to defend multiple areas simultaneously.
Consequently, it does not have an appropriate, preemptive military tool at its disposal or a credible deterrence policy to rely on in a conflict with Russia. These
deficiencies should convince Russia that there is no
military threat posed by Sweden. This logic applies to
Finland as well. By contrast, for Norway, NATO’s preemptive capabilities and ability to defend its Nordic
ally are of paramount importance.
In such a situation, all three Nordic countries would
serve as a single military complex. Consequently, they
could increase planning and preparations for a potential crisis involving Russia in the Barents Sea, the High
North, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Baltic Sea. How to
manage this security complex is explained later.
Operational Issues
Sweden’s new military doctrine is based on the
following assumptions: a credible threshold and
deterrence policy; a sufficient level of readiness and
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availability; high costs facing an aggressor; sustainability; combined operations with other nations;
and re-established comprehensive defense (totalförsvar). Geographically, the doctrine recognizes the
Baltic Sea as a potential passage for both NATO and
Russia, which emphasizes the importance of maritime and aerial control. The Arctic is described as an
area which can potentially have a large impact on the
North Atlantic. Sweden is situated in the middle of the
region and thus has great geostrategic importance for
both the West and Russia. Sweden has also prepared
for the use of nuclear weapons by an aggressor. The
doctrine addresses not only strategic nuclear weapons used for second-strike capability and for altering
the military balance but also tactical nuclear weapons
used to de-escalate conventional warfare or in special
and clandestine operations.78
Tactical capabilities must meet operational and
strategic demands. The total wartime strength of personnel currently numbers 50,000 soldiers, including
the Home Guard (Hemvärnet), consisting of 40 battalions manned by reservists. The army units include
two brigade headquarters and eight to nine battalions
(mechanized, light infantry, cavalry, and airborne),
together with field artillery, air defense, and command
and control, as well as engineer, logistics, and special
operations battalions. Of these, one could compose
two brigade-sized task forces, depending on the operational requirements. The navy has 3 maritime fleets
and 1 amphibious battalion equipped with 5 submarines, 9 corvettes, 10 vessels for mine countermeasures, and 11 landing craft and support vessels. The
air force consists of 3 air fleets and 1 helicopter unit
(equivalent) operating, among others, 97 Jas 39 C/D
Gripen multirole aircraft in 2 wings and helicopters, in
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addition to reconnaissance, anti-submarine, and transport aircraft. Currently, the army units are dispersed
in the southern half of Swedish territory but are too
few to cover all strategic areas simultaneously―in fact,
only 1 unit of the 16 is deployed north of Stockholm.
The naval and air force units are commonly regarded
as capable of countering potential aggression and supporting partners’ operations when necessary.79
As prescribed by doctrine, capabilities should be
used in the full operational depth of national territory. The conduct of combined and joint operations
with international partners must be possible, and military support from and to other states can be provided
when needed. The aggressors’ most valuable assets
and capabilities should also be targeted and affected
by Swedish offensive activities.80
New tactical thinking is the linkage between crisis
management and waging war on Swedish soil. In other
words, Sweden’s well-functioning crisis management
machine, developed for expeditionary and out-of-area
operations, albeit smaller in size, will be adjusted for
the task of national defense. Successfully recruiting
more personnel is one of the main challenges, followed by updating military education in Sweden. The
premise is promising since all three Swedish services,
however modest in size, have met high standards with
competent personnel, operational art, and interoperable units.81
The Swedish defense debate ran in high gear in
2017-2018. The government, as well as most of the
political parties, essentially agreed that the present
capabilities of the defense forces are insufficient in
the changed security-political situation. The government has, however, yet to deliver on its strong pledges
with any major increases of the defense budget.82 The
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Swedish Chief of Defense has repeatedly warned that,
unless substantial new funding is forthcoming after
2020, the capabilities of the armed forces will decrease
rather than increase.
Several investigations have been carried out to
establish the needs of the defense forces in order to fulfill their tasks. A group of high-level defense experts,
tasked by the Cabinet, concluded that a doubling of
defense expenditure would achieve that purpose.83
The defense high command studied what kind
of force structure was needed for a credible deterrent in a 5 to 15-year perspective. The proposal was
for a roughly doubled force structure with a wartime
strength of 115,000, as compared to 50,000 today,
with most of the new positions to be filled by conscripts. The army would have four brigades plus a
battlegroup on Gotland, long-range fires, rangers, and
territorial units. The navy would have 24 surface combatants armed with medium-range anti-aircraft missiles and long-range cruise missiles, 6 submarines, and
4 amphibious battalions. The air force would have 8
squadrons with 120 aircraft, a resilient and expanded
basing system, 1 squadron of unmanned aerial vehicles, missiles for the long-range attack of ground and
sea targets, as well as radar-homing missiles. This was
said to require an annual budget of US$8.3 billion by
2025 and US$13 billion by 2035―i.e., less than 2 percent
of gross domestic product. This kind of force structure
and funding level is roughly what Sweden had at the
turn of the century.84
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Nordic Capabilities and the Potential for
Common Deterrence
Certain conclusions can be drawn regarding how
to unite and combine Nordic services’ capabilities and
units to strengthen combined defense or to enhance
common deterrence. Subjective factors like national
decisions, situation analyses, operational plans, and
timelines are not considered here. Instead, the focus is
on alternative ways to allocate national capabilities for
enhanced efficiency and synergy to benefit the three
Nordic defense forces. Later, these capabilities will
be matched against the potential threat presented by
Russia’s Armed Forces, followed by considerations
related to the role to be played by the U.S. Army.
Norway’s comparatively modest army, which
effectively has the capability of one brigade, already
performs the demanding duty of territorial defense
in the northernmost part of the country. On the other
hand, Norway has the strongest navy of the three,
but it plays no role in the Baltic Sea. The air force is
capable and could operate all around the region, but
its center of gravity is in the adjacent littoral and blue
waters of Norway and the High North. Most probably, it would not be available to support the other two
armed forces elsewhere in the region in a crisis or war.
However, the three services’ levels of interoperability suffice for common operations with the other two
countries’ armed forces.
Finland’s strongest service is the army, both in
comparison to other Finnish services, and even more
so compared to the other two countries’ armies.
Its capabilities could be deployed elsewhere in the
region. Operationally, this could be northern Norway,
where the Finns could support their Norwegian
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counterparts. The Finnish Navy is modest in comparison to the Swedish Navy with its submarines and
several corvettes. The two navies could combine their
forces for a joint effort, carving out a consequential
role for themselves in the littoral Baltic Sea. However,
the combined navies of NATO member states, if made
to cooperate in the Baltic Sea, could also constitute a
substantial counterforce against Russia. This would
allow the Finnish and Swedish navies to concentrate
on their national or bilateral responsibilities, such as
securing lines of communication at sea. The Finnish
Air Force operates along the same lines as Norway’s,
which means that there are only modest capabilities
available for anything other than national duties. This
calculus will also apply after future aircraft replacements. Combining forces is challenging because Norway’s air defense is focused on different directions
than its Finnish and Swedish counterparts are.
The capabilities of Sweden’s Army, comprising two brigade-size battle groups, do not suffice to
defend the most important areas of the country, which
means that no capabilities can be released for joint
operations abroad. In this respect, combining army
units with Finland’s would help Sweden secure relevant areas and contribute to the common defense.
The Swedish and Finnish navies could combine their
capabilities for better synergy. The Swedish Air Force,
which is relatively strong in number, will be equipped
with one of the most capable air-to-air missiles. Nevertheless, it is still short of long-distance standoff precision armaments. However, the air force can operate
all over the Nordic-Baltic region utilizing foreign
infrastructure and is highly capable of cooperating
efficiently with allied units. This applies to all three
air forces. However, cooperation between the Finnish
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and Swedish units would be most effective, given
a more convergent operational focus. Nevertheless,
with more exercises, all three can achieve a high level
of interoperability.
RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES RELATED TO
DETERRENCE IN THE REGION
U.S. Military Perceptions of Russia
U.S. perceptions of Russia are crucially important
for decision-makers in friendly and allied governments. Senior U.S. military officers have been outspoken about Russia. These include the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Chief of Staff of
the Army, and a former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).85
Chief of Staff of the Army General Mark A. Milley
has called Russia “the greatest threat to the U.S.,” also
noting that senior Russian diplomats have voiced
their desire to disrupt the established world order and
dismantle NATO and the EU. Self-confident Russian
hawks even claim that:
Russia can now fight a conventional war in Europe and
win. Russia is the only country that will remain relevant
forever. Any other country is dispensable, and that
includes the United States. We are in the endgame now.86

Chairman of the JCS General Joseph Dunford has
observed that Russia has gone down a path of rearmament and military modernization, achieving virtually
unparalleled results. Russia’s long-range conventional
strike capabilities; its modernized nuclear capabilities;
and, its focus on developing a wide range of robust
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cyber, space, electronic, and undersea capabilities, in
particular, are all of concern to the United States.87
Former NATO SACEUR and commander of U.S.
European Command General Philip Breedlove gave
a bleak assessment of U.S.-Russia relations in February 2017. Breedlove said they were at their worst and
were continuing to head in the wrong direction. A
Europe “whole, free, and at peace”—as well as “prosperous”—is good for European nations, good for the
United States, and good for Russia, Breedlove stated—
for the security and stability of its leadership, and the
prosperity, opportunity, and well-being of its people.
That is a common goal to work toward, albeit with “no
shortcuts, no grand bargain that can lay a foundation
for an acceptable, sustainable future relationship.”88
U.S. Army General Curtis Scaparrotti, Head of U.S.
European Command and the present SACEUR, concurs. According to him, Russia is the Western Alliance’s number-one national security threat. Russia is
operating in domains below the level of outright war
in a very aggressive way:
they are executing a destabilization campaign, based on
a strategy that assumes if they can destabilize Western
governments, it will be to Russia’s benefit. If you look
at their military doctrine, that is part of what they call
‘indirect activity.’ They believe undermining Western
governments without ever firing a shot achieves their
ends.89

Scaparrotti notes that NATO’s eastern allies bordering Russia remain the focus of Moscow’s most
malign activities and threats, including Poland and
the Baltic States, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. Scaparrotti said in May 2018 that deterring Russia is
one of his central tasks. He is seeking more troops,
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intelligence collection tools, and other resources to
maintain U.S. military superiority and deter Russia as
Moscow presses ahead with the modernization of its
military.90
There also seems to be a general understanding
between senior U.S. military officers and the Finnish
Chief of Defense that war between different nationstates in the future is almost inevitable. In an interview in January 2017, the Finnish Chief of Defense
said, “There will still come a day when war is waged
on Finnish ground. That is an awful thought, but in
light of history it is pretty certain.”91
Russia’s Armed Forces and Their
Warfighting Capability
Russia’s military doctrine is often the starting point
for analysis of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Here we note, very briefly, only some key doctrinal matters pertinent to the discussion that follows.
Declared and real doctrines may differ from each
other. This holds particularly true for nuclear weapons, but is also applicable to conventional forces. A
distinguished, very senior nuclear weapons designer
observed, “the weapon system defines the doctrine
that exists in reality as opposed to the declared doctrine.” One vital condition for conducting an effective national security policy is the absence of a gap
between the real doctrines and the declared ones.92
Russia undoubtedly adheres to this policy.
In 2013, the Department of Strategic and Defense
Studies at the Finnish National Defence University
(NDU) published an unusually detailed and frank
general assessment of the development of Russia’s
military policy and capabilities.93 In 2016, the NDU
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published a comprehensive assessment of the Russian
armed forces toward the 2030s.94
Here, we will draw extensively on the English-language report published by the Swedish Defence
Research Agency (FOI) in 2016.95 Unless otherwise
indicated, the facts and assessments presented here
can be found in this report.
It was indirectly confirmed in August 2012 that
plans for the invasion of Georgia had been made well
before August 2008 on Russian President Vladimir
Putin’s orders.96 The brief war against Georgia fought
in August 2008 was the first major case of Russia using
overt military force against a neighboring state since
the end of the Cold War. This was soon all but forgotten. Russia’s surprise occupation of Crimea in 2014
has already been mentioned. Russia’s war in eastern
Ukraine continues today. In 2015, Russia intervened
militarily in the Syrian conflict, with major regional
ramifications. Russian military exercises and drills
have increased in scope and frequency. Russian military aircraft and ships have exhibited further reckless or aggressive behavior, not least in the Baltic Sea.
The likelihood of a military conflict with Russia has
increased and, with that, so has the need for knowledge on the fighting power of Russia’s armed forces.
The term “fighting power,” used in the FOI report,
was adopted to denote Russia’s available military
assets for three overall missions: operational-strategic
joint interservice combat operations (JISCOs), standoff warfare, and strategic deterrence.
A JISCO denotes the use of different military
branches and services to control territory. Standoff
warfare is the capability to strike enemy targets at distances of over 300 kilometers, beyond the operational
depth of a JISCO. Here, we will focus mainly on the
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Russian ground forces and discuss specific features of
the other services where necessary.97
The overall mission of the ground forces is to
repel aggression on land and protect Russia’s territorial integrity. In a deepening crisis, the ground forces
should be able to raise readiness and mobilize additional resources to fight alongside other services and
arms of the armed forces.
The ground forces have eight service arms: motor
rifle; tank; artillery and missile (surface-to-surface
missiles [SSM]); air defense (surface-to-air missiles
[SAM]); reconnaissance; engineer; chemical, biological, and radiological protection; and signal troops. The
ground forces’ higher-level (operational) large formations are 10 combined arms armies (CAA), 1 tank
army, and 2 army corps.
The ground forces’ core functions are operational
and tactical maneuver and the ability to take, hold, or
deny terrain. Motor rifle and tank units are the primary forces for these purposes. Among support functions, fire support―e.g., artillery, rocket artillery, SSM,
SAM, and anti-tank units―striking at enemy forces in
support of the maneuver stands out as a prominent
form of support.
There are at least two higher-level, all-arms formations in each of Russia’s four MDs, the nominal holders of assets for operations with―in addition to two
higher-level operational formations―other lower-level
formations from the support functions.
The most common maneuver unit is the motor
rifle brigade (MRB), consisting of some 3,000-4,000
soldiers and about 100 main battle tanks, armored
personnel carriers, or armored infantry fighting vehicles. The MRB’s core consists of three or four motor
rifle battalions and the maneuver function, plus units
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for fire support, command and control, mobility, and
sustainability.
Some brigades have been upgraded since 2013 to
become divisions consisting of two maneuver regiments with three or four maneuver battalions in each,
plus support units. In 2015, the Ministry of Defense
announced plans to create another three divisions.
The likely key reason for this is to increase the capacity for offensive operations. About half of the MRBs
are equipped with 220-240 armored infantry fighting
vehicles/armored personnel carriers―about 100 more
than in 2014.
After the unimpressive performance of the Russian
Army in the war against Georgia, Russia launched a
broad effort to improve its general operational capability and readiness. A parallel effort has gone into
improving the general living conditions within the
armed forces, which has made the army more attractive and eased persistent manning problems.
FOI, citing official figures presented by the Russian
Ministry of Defense, observes that plans for recruitment of contract soldiers have been over-fulfilled since
about 2013. Moreover, both the quantity and quality
of conscripts and contract soldiers have been boosted.
The notional number of soldiers in the armed
forces in 2016 was one million. The number of contract
soldiers (356,000) was expected to exceed that of conscripts (some 307,000) in 2016. The real strength of the
armed forces was estimated at some 910,000-930,000.
The target for 2016 of 93-percent staffing was overall
met.
In addition to the peacetime Russian armed forces,
there is a large pool of trained reserves to operate a
much larger, perhaps two-million-strong, mobilized
army.98 The mobilization system itself has not been
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well maintained, but there are signs of improvement.
In one concrete example, the mobilization of 4,000
reservists near Petrozavodsk, Karelia, where the 216th
Storage and Repair Depot is located, facilitated the
first exercise of the fully manned 4th Motorized Infantry Brigade since 1993. The exercise was held in September 2012.99
Given that Russia has held several mobilization
exercises involving diverse public sectors, an extension
to the military sphere cannot be ruled out. Demonstrating the ability to mobilize unprecedentedly high
troop strengths since the end of the Cold War, Russia
would once again surprise the West, where this capability has largely been lost and would fit the general
mindset of Putin’s administration.
Zapad-2017 was a cause for concern long before
the actual event in September 2017. Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite stated the Baltic perspective
in February 2017:
We see that risks are increasing, and we are worried
about the upcoming Zapad-2017 exercise, which will
deploy a very large and aggressive force on our borders
that will very demonstrably be preparing for a war with
the West.100

The reconstituted 1st Guards Tank Army and its
lead unit, the 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division, upgraded from brigade back to divisional status
in 2013, are particularly suited for the mission of closing the Suwałki Gap between Poland and Lithuania:
In previous exercises, we have seen a deployment pattern
of this unit moving into Belarus to take up that mission.
From Russian open press comments, it appears as if the
unit has a five-day window to achieve movement into its
position into Belarus.101
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No feared, large-scale mobilization happened
either during the Zapad-2017 exercise or during the
Vostok-2018 exercise. Nevertheless, regardless of
the exercise’s scale, the goal set and the staff work
involved were of primary importance.102 In addition,
the exercise fulfilled an important messaging function.
A seasoned British analyst later observed:
To have Europe alarmed at the prospect of new Russian
military adventurism is an entirely comfortable position
for Moscow; it is the desired result of its consistent
rhetoric and regular dropping of hints at direct military
action against its neighbors or competitors further afield.
Overall, the exercise demonstrated Russia’s preparation
to counter any deterrence by punishment on the part
of a global force capable of carrying out an aerospace
attack―in other words, NATO led by the United States.
Zapad also showed attention to maintaining escalation
dominance.103

Whereas Russia claimed that the number of soldiers
participating in Zapad-2017 was within the Vienna
Document limits―i.e., less than 13,000―Vostok-2018
was hailed as the biggest exercise since Zapad-1981,
involving about 300,000 service personnel. What this
actually meant is uncertain, as a breakdown of the figures into specific categories has not been disclosed.
Were they from the Ministry of Defense armed forces
only, or were paramilitary and civilian participants
included? Did all participants deploy to the field, or
were support staff at bases included? What can be
stated with confidence, however, is that Vostok-2018
was big.
A key command and control aspect of Vostok2018 was to command and prepare interservice force
groups for warfighting. Two-sided maneuvers were

53

conducted on all levels. There were two operational-strategic force groups; the Eastern MD and Russia’s Pacific Fleet stood against the Central MD and
the Northern Fleet. This enabled training with independently acting adversaries, a more realistic feature
than that offered by a scripted exercise. Simultaneously assembling two force groups is a major command and control challenge. The attempt to do so
indicates a high level of confidence in both command
and control and the forces’ abilities.
It can be concluded therefore that the Vostok-2018
strategic exercise was not about tactical-level shootouts. It was about preparing for protracted, strategic-level warfighting operations.104
Exercises clearly have a direct impact on both capabilities and readiness. Russian military exercises in the
2010s have focused on large-scale JISCO―i.e., launching and waging inter-nation-state wars, with the possible use of nuclear weapons. Exercises involved all
branches of service and arms and all MDs. Two types
of exercises stand out: annual strategic exercises like
Zapad-2017 and Vostok-2018 and surprise combat
readiness inspections, also known as snap exercises.
Sweden’s FOI has published a detailed account of the
exercises that occurred between 2009 and 2017.105
Annual strategic exercises rotate among the MDs
and give Russian forces opportunities to train where
they may have to fight, FOI observes. Exercises
involved all branches of service and arms from the
host MD with reinforcements from other MDs or centrally controlled forces. They also involved ministries,
services, and agencies engaged in defense, such as the
interior troops or the Federal Security Service of the
Russian Federation, reflecting the Russian notion of
military organization.
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Sometimes a parallel exercise for a joint interservice force elsewhere in Russia accompanied the
annual strategic exercises, enabling the central level to
train for the command and control of two simultaneous operations.
Surprise inspections began in 2013 with the aim
of preparing the armed forces for the transition from
peace to war and in order to improve combat readiness systematically. Major surprise inspections can test
forces from more than one branch of service or arm
and often a whole MD. Subsidiary surprise inspections have involved either units or service branches.
Russia’s military exercises have differed profoundly from the West’s post-Cold War exercises,
which have not focused on large-scale inter-nationstate wars or nuclear operations. The magnitude of the
Russian annual strategic exercises, measured by the
manpower involved, has increased roughly 10-fold
since 2011, and will probably see further increases.
Russia has skillfully exploited Western weaknesses,
recognizing that quantity has a quality of its own.
The West has only recently begun to become
aware of these new realities. Russia has come so far
that catching up and “rebooting” Western armed
forces to accommodate more traditional NATO tasks
like territorial defense will not be easy and will take
time. It should be recalled that Russia started to plan
the operations in Georgia more than a year-and-a-half
before the execution of the military campaign. FOI
observes that Russia’s military operations in Ukraine
and Syria were preceded by few telltale signs, even
though military preparations began weeks, probably
even months, before operations began. An armed conflict may arise swiftly, but its duration is impossible to
assess in advance.106
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In evaluating the potential order of battle for a
JISCO, a natural starting point is looking at initially
available forces in each of the five main theaters of
war―Eastern, Central Asian, Southern, Western, and
the Arctic―and their associated five JSCs and MDs in
peacetime. MD forces constitute an initial response
force in contingencies.
In addition, it is prudent to assess the potential
order of battle for a JISCO, given that Russia has reinforcements that can be deployed to any of the theaters of war. Russia has demonstrated an impressive
ability during exercises in recent years to transport
rapidly large military formations over thousands of
kilometers.
This theme was further developed in an FOI report
in October 2018. Building on the results of the surprise
combat readiness inspections, FOI assesses that the
Russian armed forces can launch operations involving
forces from one MD in 1-2 weeks. Operations on the
scale of a regional war, involving forces from several
MDs, can be launched in 2-4 weeks, depending on, for
example, the transport of reinforcements.107
FOI assumes that Russia’s transport system is
adequate for larger force deployments and does not
restrict reinforcements between different theaters, at
least for redeploying up to two army-sized formations.
Russia has both strategic and tactical transport assets
to ensure that such transport needs are handled properly, with adequate support from civilian agencies.
Keeping these factors in mind, we will primarily focus on the Western and Arctic strategic directions and the force dispositions in these regions. The
increased Russian focus on the Western direction with
its associated military build-up was identified in Finnish NDU reports as early as 2011 and 2013.108
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Using official equipment serviceability figures,
FOI estimates that two-thirds of all nominally available air force units (aircraft and helicopter units) are
combat ready, as are practically all air defense units.
Seventy-six percent of navy units are combat-ready.
Serviceability in other forces is above 90 percent and,
therefore, FOI assumes that all of these units are
combat-capable.109
The Western MD’s peacetime force disposition consists of four ground-force maneuver formations: the
1st Tank Army; the 6th and 20th CAAs; and, the 11th
Army Corps, which has three maneuver brigades tied
to Kaliningrad. Other formations include 12 maneuver brigades (or equivalents), 4 of which are organized
into 2 divisions, probably to ensure stronger offensive
capability. In addition, there are three air assault and
airborne divisions in the Western MD.
Each CAA has support brigades for command and
control, fire support, and sustainability, but not mobility. The 1st Tank Army has no sustainability field support units of its own, which could potentially impede
resource-consuming armored maneuvers.
The aerospace forces’ fire support is larger here
than in other MDs, probably reflecting concern about
NATO’s collective air power. The 6th Air Army has 11
fighter/multi-role squadrons; 4 fighter-bomber squadrons; 7 attack helicopter squadrons; and, 4 air defense
divisions, 2 of which primarily defend Moscow. Aircraft and helicopter transport assets are larger than
those in other MDs. The navy’s key role would be to
support a maneuver with the naval infantry, primarily in the Baltic Sea. The interior troops’ paramilitary
support would be based on two divisions and nine
brigades.110
The Arctic theater has received increased attention
during the last few years. This area covers the northern
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parts of Russia and Scandinavia, including Finland as
well as the Arctic Ocean. The Arctic theater received
formal recognition as an area of strategic interest in
December 2014 with the creation of the Northern JSC
and its associated MD, based on the Northern Fleet.
Two overall tasks for the Northern JSC are relevant here: to ensure the nuclear strike capabilities
of the Northern Fleet’s strategic submarines; and, to
ensure situational awareness and air defense in Russia’s Arctic regions. The first task requires assets for a
JISCO to defend the Kola region. The Northern Fleet
and the 45th Air Army are the units for that mission.
A naval infantry brigade and two MRBs are the key
ground-force maneuver units. They lack field units
for fire support, mobility, and sustainability, which
reduces the potential for combat operations. Instead,
the 45th Air Army’s assets for fire support include
some two squadrons of fighter-bomber aircraft, a
squadron of MiG-31 long-range fighter aircraft, and an
air defense division. The navy’s fire support would be
a carrier-based squadron of multi-role aircraft and air
defense from one destroyer and two cruisers as well
as land attack cruise missiles from the Yasen-class sub
marine, Severodvinsk.
In 2015, the former head of the Main Operations
Directorate of the Russian General Staff and commander of the Western MD, Deputy Defense Minister
Colonel General Andrei Kartapolov, voiced Russia’s
concern that NATO could use Finnish and Swedish infrastructure in the north as a staging area for
air operations, thereby threatening Russia’s vitally
important basing area in the Kola Peninsula.111 In addition, Russia would probably have a clear incentive
and interest to deny NATO this option in the context
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of possible NATO plans for air operations in support
of the ground forces in the Baltic States.
How large of a force could Russia deploy for a
JISCO? FOI estimates that a large-scale JISCO would
include some 150,000 servicemen. This roughly corresponds to the size of an annual strategic exercise and
surprise inspections in the Western MD in 2014 and
the Eastern MD in 2013.
A large-scale, ground-centric, Russian JISCO
could consist of the following: one-third ground-force
maneuver units; one-third ground-force support functions; and, one-third forces other than ground forces.
This would mean a ground-force core in the JISCO
of 3 to 4 CAAs with some 14-19 maneuver brigade
equivalents, including airborne and naval infantry
units. Each large formation would have additional
support from one artillery brigade, one SSM brigade,
and one air defense brigade. The CAA would also be
supported by two to four engineer brigades as well
as logistics brigades, as detailed. Such a force would
enable a JISCO with ground-force formations operating in echelons, which facilitates fighting an adversary
with similar forces and, indeed, theater-level offensive
operations.112
Russia’s ambitious State Armaments Program,
known as GPV-2020 and covering the current decade,
has produced mixed results. Heavy investment in the
strategic nuclear triad, air defense, offensive standoff
ballistic missile, and cruise missile systems has borne
fruit, but problems remain with the provision of significant volumes of modern fighter aircraft and naval
combat units.
The modernization of the Russian ground forces’
equipment has not proceeded exactly to plan. The
ambitious effort to introduce a new main battle tank,
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the T-14 Armata, plus a host of other tracked and
wheeled armored vehicles, has been delayed, and the
entire program has been extended to 2025. It is therefore probable that the bulk of Russia’s main battle
tanks will consist of T-72B3 tanks well into the 2020s
or longer, given an anticipated price tag three to four
times higher than the cost of upgrading the T-72 to the
T-72B3.113
After production of the T-90 main battle tank
ceased in 2011, several hundred T-72s have been
upgraded to the T-72B3 standard annually.114 The
refurbished and upgraded T-72B3 and its later version, the T-72B3M, are fitted with a new engine; a new
gunner’s sight, including a French night vision kit; a
new fire control system; and a new main gun with significantly less dispersion than the original gun.115 The
T-72B3M’s capability is comparable to the T-90’s but
costs only a fraction of the price.
Artillery has retained much of its traditional, prominent role in the Russian ground forces’ warfighting.
Although most of Russia’s present artillery systems
may have been regarded as outdated and as nearing
the end of their service lives, the war in Ukraine has
proven otherwise. In one example, a single Russian
artillery “fire strike” almost destroyed two Ukrainian
mechanized battalions in the span of a few minutes
during the battle for Zelenopillya in July 2014.
Major General Robert Scales, former commandant
of the U.S. Army War College, has warned of:
what might happen to U.S. artillery should we fight the
Russians or a Russian surrogate. New Russian firepower
systems now outrange ours by a third or more. They have
improved on our steel-rain technology by developing a
new generation of bomblet munitions that are filled with
thermobaric explosives. These munitions generate an
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intense blast wave of exploding gases that are far more
lethal than conventional explosives. A single volley of
Russian thermobaric steel rain delivered by a single
heavy-rocket-launcher battalion will annihilate anything
within an area of about 350 acres.116

Russian tactical drones, which seek out artillery, are both capable and numerous. In 2014, at the
beginning of the battle for Debaltseve, the Ukrainians
reported that as many as eight Russian tactical drones
were in the air over their lines at any given moment.117
Additionally, the electronic warfare capabilities
demonstrated by the Russians in Ukraine have been
impressive. During the 240-day siege of Donetsk airport, the Russians were able to jam global positioning
systems, radios, and radar signals. Their electronic
intercept capabilities were good enough to cripple
Ukrainian communications. Any Ukrainian radio
transmission triggered a punishing barrage within
seconds.118
FOI observes that data on Russian production of
artillery systems is less readily available than data on
other systems, making it more difficult to reconstruct
exact figures. It is known that 108 howitzers, probably
the 2S19M1 Msta-S, were delivered in 2012-2014. Procurement of a batch of 42 additional 2S19M2 Msta-S’s
is slated for 2016-2019.
The first deliveries of Russia’s newest self-propelled howitzer, the Koalitsiya SV, were expected for
the Western MD before the end of 2016. The deputy
chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission said
that the bulk of the Koalitsiya SVs would be delivered
to the troops from 2019 onward. Over time, it should
replace the 2S19 Msta-S.
The Tornado is a generic designation for modernized multiple rocket launchers, of which the Tornado
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G passed into serial production in 2013. In 10-15 years,
it should completely replace the BM-21 Grad system,
which has been in service since 1963.119
Ballistic missiles have been an integral part of the
rocket and artillery forces in Russia’s ground forces,
even after the implementation of the Intermediate
Nuclear Range Forces (INF) Treaty in the early 1990s.
The new Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone) missile system,
which replaces the older Tochka-U (SS-21) short-range
ballistic missile, was declared operational in July 2010
in Luga in what was then the Leningrad MD.120
The dual-capable Iskander-M has introduced a
completely new dimension to ground-force standoff
operations. From a military capabilities point of view,
deployment of an Iskander brigade in Luga, some 100
kilometers south of Saint Petersburg, presented a real
risk to several states in the Baltic Sea region, including Finland and Sweden, with the possibility of a
decapitating attack only minutes away. Finland, however, maintained a low-profile attitude on this front
and did not even ask the Russian authorities to clarify the motives behind this move. This issue attained
prominence in European politics later after the missile
system was deployed to Kaliningrad permanently.
Two new Iskander brigade sets have been procured
annually since 2013.
The operational performance and maximum range
of the ballistic Iskander-M missile, estimated to be
over 700 kilometers, seems to exceed the 500-kilometer range stipulated by the INF Treaty, but the United
States has not yet issued a formal complaint.121 An
important operational feature of the Iskander-M units
to consider is that both ballistic missiles and cruise
missiles will be under the same brigade command.122
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The cruise missile is the Iskander-K, NATO designation SSC-7. This cruise missile apparently possesses
a range far above the INF-approved range ceiling.
Judging from the dimensions of the missile and compared to the longer-range 2,000-kilometer-plus RK-55
(SSC-X-4 Slingshot), the range of the Iskander-K is
probably 1,000-1,500 kilometers. The United States
has voiced concerns about probable Russian violations of the INF Treaty since 2014.123 The complaints have specifically concerned land-based cruise
missiles―although, formally, these belong to a groundlaunched version of the Novator 9M729 system which
employs the Kalibr-NK cruise missile, not the Iskander
system.124
Russia has invested heavily in land-attack cruise
missile technology for at least a decade and has progressed significantly in this respect. New long-range
cruise missiles have been deployed in the air force, the
navy, and the ground forces. They can reach targets
in western Europe, including the Baltic Sea region.
In addition, Russian cruise missile force projection
against the continental United States is no longer theoretical, even from land.
In February 2017, The New York Times broke the
news that Russia had deployed two battalions of
SSC-8 cruise missiles, evidenced by reports that U.S.
officials had dropped the “X” from the original testing phase designation of the missile system, SSC-X-8.
One of the battalions is believed to have been moved
from the Kapustin Yar test site in December 2016 to
an undisclosed location, probably a base in western
Russia.125
The U.S. Vice Chairman of the JCS, General Paul
Selva, confirmed this in a House Armed Services Committee hearing on March 8, 2017:
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The system itself presents a risk to most of our facilities
in Europe, and we believe that the Russians have
deliberately deployed it in order to pose a threat to NATO
and to facilities within the NATO area of responsibility.

In addition, Russia has violated the “spirit and intent”
of the INF Treaty as a whole. “I don’t have enough
information on their intent to conclude other than
they do not intend to return to compliance.”126 Russia
immediately followed the U.S. decision to withdraw
from the INF Treaty in February 2019, and has never
admitted any treaty breach.
FOI assessed Russia’s available standoff assets
quantitatively in the Western theater in 2016.127 Realistic operational ranges of the various ballistic missiles
and cruise missiles were obtained by reducing the
nominal ranges by one-third.
The number of land-attack missiles available for
a standoff strike has increased three-fold since FOI’s
2013 estimate, both with conventional and nuclear
warheads. In 2016, the introduction of Kalibr missile
systems in the navy and continued upgrading of strategic bombers and ground forces’ missile brigades (to
the Iskander-M system in the latter) resulted in the
availability of some 150-166 conventional long-range
cruise missiles and up to 96 short-range land-attack
missiles, enough for two powerful salvos.128 In addition, a brigade set of presumably 12 Iskander-M missile systems and 60 Kalibr missiles were delivered to
the Russian Armed Forces in May 2017.129 The distribution of the Kalibr cruise missiles to the services was
not disclosed, but a part may have gone to the rocket
and artillery forces of the Russian Army.130
The number of available air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) is not known, but the current arsenal
may allow for a standoff strike with over 100 missiles.
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In late 2016, 97 ALCMs were known to have been fired
as part of the Syrian operation. In addition, an undisclosed number of new, long-range Kh-101 ALCMs
were used in February and July 2017.131 However, it
should be noted that none of the attacks with longrange weapons in Syria, perhaps with the exception of
the Kh-101, were actual standoff strikes, as all targets
were within the air operation area.
In addition, Tu-22M3 medium-range bombers, primarily assigned to anti-ship missions, in a secondary
role, could have 42-58 long-range cruise missiles and
66-78 short-range or medium-range missiles available
for a non-strategic nuclear standoff strike.
In the assessment of the potential order of battle for
a land-centric JISCO and standoff warfare, FOI sums
up the following main conclusions about the armed
forces’ fighting power in 2016:
First, the fighting power of Russia’s Armed Forces has
continued to increase. The ability to carry out JISCOs
and stand-off warfare as well as strategic deterrence
has improved. This has been made possible by the
introduction of additional units and weapons systems,
through increased readiness and―primarily where the
Ground Forces are concerned―a higher proportion of
combat-ready units.132

Regarding JISCOs, the key quantitative factor is
that manning levels have increased to a point where
most nominally available units have adequate manning (above 75 percent). This increased manpower
allows for more combat-capable units than in 2013.
In addition, a few additional brigade-size maneuver
units have been set up.
Standoff warfare capabilities have grown thanks
to significant deliveries of launchers and missiles. The
number of available land-attack missiles―with both
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conventional warheads and non-strategic nuclear warheads―has tripled since 2013. However, the lack of
command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities
may restrict standoff warfare mainly to fixed targets.
FOI’s second main conclusion is that Russia can
launch two large operations simultaneously. The
armed forces can generate enough units for two largescale JISCOs while retaining a strategic reserve and
a small interservice force group in each theater. Russian annual strategic exercises have often featured
a second, parallel―albeit smaller―joint interservice
exercise. Since late 2015, Russia has run two operations in Syria and Ukraine simultaneously. A possible
order of battle for two JISCOs with some 150,000 servicemen in three or four ground force formations plus
navy and aerospace force support for each is feasible.
It seems that the armed forces are developing from
a force primarily designed for handling internal disorder and conflicts within the former Soviet Union
toward a structure configured for large-scale operations beyond that area. The armed forces were more
capable of defending Russia against foreign aggression in 2016 than they were in 2013. They are also a
stronger instrument of coercion than before.
FOI’s third main conclusion is that the armed forces
have improved their fighting power primarily west
of the Urals. The Western MD has received the most
new command structures and units, including two
MRBs from the Central MD. Russia has also set up a
joint interservice force group on the illegally annexed
Crimean Peninsula. The creation of larger formations
of armed forces improves offensive capabilities and
has been more pronounced west of the Urals.
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Nuclear Considerations
After the establishment of the INF Treaty, in which
Presidents George H. W. Bush (United States), Mikhail
Gorbachev (Soviet Union), and Boris Yeltsin (Russian Federation) agreed upon limited U.S. groundlaunched cruise missiles and the implementation of
legally non-binding unilateral Presidential Nuclear
Initiatives, the nuclear capability of the U.S. Army
ended.133 Thereafter, U.S. nuclear deterrence posture
and the custody of operational nuclear weapons have
rested with the U.S. Air Force (Minuteman III strategic
missiles, strategic bombers with air-launched strategic
cruise missiles, nuclear bombs, and dual-capable multirole aircraft carrying non-strategic nuclear bombs)
and the U.S. Navy (Trident D5 strategic submarines
and missiles). An important additional fact is that all
of the U.S. Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear
sea-launched nuclear missile warheads have been
dismantled.134
Russia, on the other hand, has never abided by the
unilateral presidential agreements. All services still
employ nuclear weapons, and Russia tries to capitalize on this asymmetry. Therefore, it is important to
understand Russian nuclear thinking and, particularly, how it relates to non-strategic nuclear weapons
and the very controversial doctrine of nuclear deescalation, which Russian military thinkers began to
develop after the end of the Cold War.135 To understand what is happening now in Europe in the field of
non-strategic nuclear weapons, we need to go back 40
years in time.
NATO’s prime concern in the late 1970s was the
ongoing heavy build-up of a family of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Re-establishing the
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equilibrium of military forces in Europe demanded
a Western counterweight of in-theater nuclear forces
should arms control fail. German Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt played a pivotal role in internal deliberations with U.S., British, and French leaders that led
to NATO’s dual-track decision in 1979 to develop,
produce, and deploy nuclear-tipped U.S. cruise and
Pershing II missiles in Europe if the Soviet Union
declined to negotiate reductions in this missile category. The Soviets did not yield, and deployment eventually took place.
Schmidt understood the risks well, as non-nuclear
West Germany would carry the main risk of nuclear
annihilation in war. This risk, however, had to be
weighed against the risk of nuclear decoupling which
the U.S. “Euro-strategic” weapons addressed, and
which saved Germany from possible Soviet intimidation and extortion. Schmidt eventually lost his position
as chancellor, but, in 1987, the Soviet Union yielded.
The INF Treaty was born.136
The present situation in Europe closely resembles
that which was described earlier. Russia has come far
in its efforts to regain what was lost with the implementation of INF.137 This time, a new deployment of
U.S. land-based medium-range nuclear weapons in
Europe is highly unlikely. More importantly, from a
practical point of view, such a decision would come
all too late, as developing suitable weapons to match
Russia’s new systems typically takes a decade. For
the non-strategic nuclear deterrence role, NATO
has no choice but to rely on present U.S. nuclear
non-strategic capabilities―primarily, the B-2 stealth
bomber and available, low-yield B61 gravity bombs.
Early introduction of the new, variable-yield B61-12
nuclear bomb would be desirable. The deterrent value
of NATO’s fourth-generation, dual-capable fighter
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aircraft deployed in Europe is highly questionable.
A turn for the better may be expected when the new
U.S. F-35 fighter assumes its nuclear role and arrives
in quantity in Europe.
The life cycles of the Russian and U.S. nuclear
weapons systems are essentially out of step at a time
when the prospects for further arms control measures
are poor. The United States is only in the early stages
of renewing its nuclear forces. The Defense Science
Board and prominent nuclear weapons professionals
have described the steps necessary to preserve nuclear
deterrence.138
In October 2018, President Donald Trump
announced the U.S. intention to withdraw from the
INF Treaty.139 Turning the clock back and reintroducing land-based, non-strategic nuclear weapons to
the U.S. Army is not a decision that should be taken
lightly. It would come with substantial political, organizational, and economic costs.140 Given the developments in INF-category weaponry, particularly in the
Russian and Chinese armed forces, the U.S. Army
may feel outgunned. This concern is understandable.
Possible conventional compensatory measures have
been outlined.141
However, the U.S. Army already fulfills an important related role―providing extended air defense and
missile defense with its land-based defensive systems, such as Patriot and Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense, essential for protection against conventional and non-strategic nuclear threats. Strengthening
U.S.-NATO missile defense capabilities in Europe is a
legitimate means of blunting the non-strategic nuclear
threat facing Europe.
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COMMON DETERRENCE IN THE REGION
Potential Russian Military Offensive Against the
Baltic Republics
Russia’s aggression against Georgia and Ukraine
has disrupted peace, stability, and relations between
Moscow and its Western neighbors. Further activities and deterioration of cooperation have raised concerns about Russia’s intentions to divide, distract,
and deter Europe from challenging Russia’s activities
in the region. In order to provide deeper knowledge
and more profound understanding, several research
institutions have published reports that examine the
threat Russia may present to the three Baltic States,
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: all of the countries are
former Soviet republics and NATO member states
that border Russia. The research questions considered
the consequences of Russian attempts to reclaim territory belonging to the three Baltic States as well as the
steps NATO could take to prevent or mitigate such a
scenario.142
The key finding shared by numerous research
reports was that NATO at present could not successfully defend the territory of its most vulnerable
member states. This cannot be regarded as a surprise
for those who have analyzed regional operational
issues during and after the Cold War. Conclusions
in the research reports describing potential NATO
responses can be divided into three categories. The
first consists of responses preferring deterrence by
denial―in other words, striving for a military balance
using, for instance, rotational armored brigade combat
teams or permanent trigger units. The second prefers
deterrence by punishment, emphasizing a solution

70

short of establishing full parity with the opposing side
in peacetime. The third category combines elements of
the other two. In the majority of the reports, additional
military capabilities are the key factor, followed by
questions such as permanence, prepositioning, restrictions, and rotations, among other issues.
Probably the most devastating finding of the multiple two-sided wargames conducted by the RAND
Corporation was that Russian forces could reach the
outskirts of the Estonian and Latvian capitals and the
coastline of the Baltic Sea in less than 60 hours. Consequently, such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with
severe challenges to its unity and reactiveness.
Based on the cases described across the many wargames, several alternative approaches could be foreseen as a NATO reaction. These can be grouped into
two categories. First, NATO could “conceal,” at least
temporarily, its defeat. However, this approach risks
recognizing severe consequences for cohesion and the
Alliance’s commitment to collective defense. These
unwanted consequences could be mitigated through
the imposition of political and economic sanctions
on Russia. Second, NATO could react by launching
a rapid counteroffensive to liberate the Baltic States,
with a high risk of escalation and enormous expenses.
In addition, there exist various combinations of these
two approaches.
Deterrence could be established to avoid such a
scenario with relatively acceptable expenses, in comparison to the catastrophic consequences of a prolonged war between Russia and a far wealthier and
more powerful coalition. Further gaming indicated
that a force of some seven brigades, including three
heavy armored brigades―adequately supported by
air power, land-based firepower, and other enablers
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on the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities―could suffice to prevent the rapid conquest of
the Baltic States. This set of capabilities would not suffice for a sustained defense of the region or to achieve
NATO’s Article 5 requirement, but it could fundamentally change the strategic calculus in Moscow.143
In addition, it would deter Russia from maintaining
its present overwhelming force correlation numbers,
politically important tools of intimidation and extortion. Such a large military force, in the eyes of the
Russians, could be credible enough to preempt direct
military aggression, which would drag allied contingents, especially those of the U.S. Army, into the conflict. However, unambiguously deterring―namely,
deploying and sustaining a credible force―would
require up to 21 maneuver brigades with the necessary
enablers and NATO’s defense infrastructure, logistics,
and legal arrangements. It is expected that up to 12 of
those brigades would come from the U.S. Army.144 In
this context, the figures are clearly based on cautious
calculations.
More importantly for NATO, this force of seven
brigades could delay the advance of the aggressor’s
units and prevent the enemy from seeking a relatively
quick and inexpensive victory based on the belief that
it can rapidly achieve its objectives and establish a fait
accompli situation on the ground. Thereafter, Russia
would aim to dictate terms to the Alliance, including
possible threats of nuclear escalation to divide the
allies and complicate decision-making. Such a strategy would demonstrate Russia’s belief that it may be
able to offset the conventional military and economic
strength of NATO and the EU, respectively.145
Creating this deterrent force of seven brigades
could be deemed expensive, with annual costs of
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approximately US$2.7 billion. On the other hand,
these expenses should be balanced against the alternative of a devastating war, the failure to defend one’s
most exposed and vulnerable allies, the implicit failure of deterrence, and the potential disintegration of
NATO.146
NATO as a Regional Transformer for
Enhanced Deterrence
Deeper cooperation is the norm today, and new
offers are introduced frequently. In February 2017,
the UK invited Nordic-Baltic nations to take part in
the 2017 JEF, where the UK operated through the JEF
as the framework nation for the Very High Readiness
Joint Task Force―the spearhead unit of the NRF. For
2018-2019, Trident Juncture, a highlight of High Visibility Exercise 2018, hosted by Norway and organized
in northern Europe and the northern Atlantic, constituted the next phase toward effective common use of
military capabilities. As planning began, the North
Atlantic Council invited Finland and Sweden to take
part in the preparatory modules and exercise in October-November 2018.
All of the allied armed forces train together.
However, both Nordic partners also participate in
dozens of NATO exercises annually, implementing
allied standards. For the U.S. Army, in spring 2016,
a U.S. Stryker company conducted training exercises
together with its counterparts in Finland for the first
time. Since then, U.S. Army units have been exercising
in Finland annually (Arrow 17 and Arrow 18) as well
as in Sweden (Aurora 17). Exercising together not only
promotes allied standards but also draws on lessons
learned from crisis management operations. Since the
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Balkan wars, casualty avoidance has been a dominant
characteristic of Western armed forces.
As a result, risk aversion and the political requirement to avoid both casualties and collateral damage
lead friendly forces to deliver effects from greater and
safer distances. This requirement has clearly reduced
the overall efficiency of capabilities, even that of
standoff and precision-guided weaponry, given the
extended ranges and higher launch altitudes involved.
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, the use of missiles and rockets, as well as aircraft, helicopters, and
drones, must be re-evaluated in the larger context of
warfare. Similarly, infiltration and clandestine operations targeting society must be analyzed in detail
in order to identify efficient counteractions in all
domains, including hybrid and cyber. This kind of
cooperation is already ongoing within NATO and
with the Alliance’s partners.147
The framework for a regional grouping could be
based on regular, NATO-led exercises attended by
both Finland and Sweden. Currently, the JEF is the
UK’s main contribution to the enhanced NRF, emphasizing its role in collective defense, but the arrangement is neither NATO-led nor permanent. The UK-led
NRF contribution is rotational and temporary, jointly
with the largest of European allied nations. Both Finland and Sweden decided to join the JEF activities in
2018. For continuity, NATO could be the most appropriate agency for coordination, using its regional command and force structures.148
The participation and interoperability goals could
remain PfP-oriented as earlier, but the regionally
focused structures and tasks should enhance participants’ common defense capabilities. Exercises
should contribute to the territorial defense efforts and
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deterrence policies of participating countries. Finally,
the exercised force should then be available for territorial defense in the region. The deeper one proceeds
with territorial and common defense issues, the more
useful an official governmental agreement between
participants becomes. Such an agreement is primarily designed to encompass administrative and legal
responsibilities, ensuring accountability, for instance,
in the context of information exchange and various
security tasks. Practical obstacles could also be alleviated with initiatives such as military Schengen when
operating with military units on European soil.149 The
main benefit could be interlinked operational planning, capabilities-related exercises, and advanced
preparation for the use of force in the region. Whether
this is feasible without all participants possessing
NATO membership remains to be seen. Similarly,
NATO as a collective should accept terms for Norway’s deeper cooperation with the Nordic partners of
the Alliance. These arguments apply to the provision
of foreign military assistance as communicated in the
Lisbon Treaty or the Swedish solidarity declaration.
Another NATO-related observation is that the
recent convergence of defense postures seems to
strengthen the roles, privileges, and responsibilities of
partners, blurring the line distinguishing partnership
from membership. Cooperation with Nordic states has
also called into question the status of collective defense
as the exclusive domain of NATO member states. The
crucial political question is how partners can proceed
further without entering the domain of member states,
as NATO finds itself increasingly involved in military
efforts featuring coalitions of the willing and requiring
outside partners. This question gains more relevance
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when addressing digitalization, cyber defense, or
hybrid threats.
COMMON DETERRENCE—GRADUAL
PROGRESS WITH THE U.S. ARMY
Building deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic region
is a high-priority issue involving all countries in the
region, including the United States and other NATO
members and partners. This is taking place against the
background of serious possible scenarios. One of the
most often cited scenarios was restated in September
2018 with a warning that―as mentioned earlier―it is:
not only a possibility, but indeed quite likely, that Russian
bastion defense would include a limited ground operation
against Norway’s northeastern county of Finnmark in
order to reduce the risks of land-based threats to the key
Kola bases.150

The Trident Juncture exercise held in October
through November 2018, particularly its classified
wargaming command post exercise, addressed these
issues.151 A military conflict in the High North is, of
course, not to be seen in isolation, but, rather, in a
broader context involving the Baltic Sea area as well.
Led by the Finnish Navy, exercise Northern Coasts
18, with “4.000 people, more than 40 surface vessels
and multiple aircraft” from 13 countries, including
the United States, was held simultaneously in the
Baltic Sea area. Northern Coasts, which started as the
German Navy’s exercise, has been conducted annually since 2007.152
Finnish and Swedish participation in international
exercises of this nature proceeds from the sober recognition that the countries could not possibly avoid being
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drawn into a conflict between Russia and NATO.153 The
final report of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences dealing with the challenges to the Swedish total
defense concept also included results from wargames.
The four scenarios developed―strategic influence
operations against Swedish decision-making, a hybrid
war against Gotland, limited military attacks against
southern Sweden as a prelude to Baltic invasion, and
limited military attacks through Finland to northern
Sweden―illustrate the thinking among senior Swedish
military officers and defense analysts.154 These considerations may serve as an illustration of the framework
for further development of defense cooperation aimed
at providing common deterrence.
The approach described next is based on the experience of 2 decades of military cooperation between
NATO and partners Finland and Sweden. Norwegian
contributions are encouraged whenever possible. The
approach identifies the military means of enhancing
deterrence together or separately and within currently
existing frameworks of cooperation, most of which
could be supported by the U.S. Army. The recent
reports produced by the Finnish and Swedish defense
ministries contain illustrative examples, but these will
be extended and developed further.155
Potential areas of cooperation include exercises,
education and training, situational awareness and
surveillance, the common use of infrastructure, materiel support, and combined units. Good examples are
many but are also quite often related to naval or air
force cooperation. For instance, the future end-state
insofar as Finnish-Swedish naval cooperation is concerned could be defined as a standing, binational
naval task group.156 This force could establish sea control and protect the use of sea lines of communication
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in the Baltic Sea, shaping the impact of anti-access/
area denial. In another example, the Nordic air forces
could establish a common air operation or a combined
unit for operations. The end-state would cover the full
spectrum of air operation capabilities, help achieve
regional air supremacy, and provide air support for
land and maritime operations. The Nordic air forces
would address the anti-access/area-denial problem
much as the Nordic navies do. To sum up, cooperation
could significantly contribute to strengthening the
common deterrence policy of participating countries.
Aspirations for the Finnish and Swedish armies
have been markedly modest, leaving room for
improvement at a bilateral level. However, the same
applies to thinking about the role to be played by the
U.S. Army. An example of a more ambitious goal
could be a joint Finnish-Swedish brigade. This would
include enhanced force integration and interoperability via a common advanced training and exercise
platform which would prepare units for deployment―
potentially for national and common defense purposes. The units and components of the brigade
should be trained and exercised in both Finland and
Sweden to provide a broad-based knowledge of both
countries regarding operational practices and the concept of operational depth. For instance, the brigade
could be used to protect designated assets and capabilities of value for Finland and Sweden and, perhaps,
even Norway. In this context, early planning of exercises with U.S. Army participation would certainly
add value to future operations.
Similarly, the common use of training and live
firing facilities in both Finland and Sweden would
benefit the U.S. Army as it enhances its operational
effectiveness in the region’s Arctic conditions. Many of
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these activities could benefit from the existing NATO
training and exercise program, enhanced NRF contributions, and the Trident Juncture Exercise, the latter
two of which already involve Finland and Sweden,
and the last of which was hosted by Norway, which
adds to overall synergy.157
Utilizing some less inclusive arrangements, such
as the NBG training concept, involving only the
selected countries could bolster results. This would
mean enhanced opportunities and fewer expenses for
all participating countries and the U.S. Army. Other
areas for enhanced cooperation are logistics, including
transport and maintenance of prepositioned materiel
for regular exercises, as well as outsourcing.
Joint capabilities are essential for all exercises.
Command and control systems in particular, including secure communications and properly functioning
logistics, must be fully available from the very start to
all participants to ensure operational efficiency (e.g.,
the concept of Day-One Connectivity developed by the
NATO Partnership Interoperability Advocacy Group).
The possibility of testing and evaluating command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence
capabilities in the Nordic and Arctic operational environment should be explored with relevant NATO
agencies, such as the NATO Consultation, Command,
and Control Agency. The so-called military Schengen
agreement, or the military mobility concept, which
was repeatedly called for by U.S. Army Europe, serves
as a good example of a practical and quick remedy to
overcome a vital obstacle.158 For this to materialize,
NATO can draw from existing logistic, maintenance,
out-sourcing, and other arrangements, such as the
NATO Procurement and Supply Agency, to support
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exercises and operations that would be useful for
Nordic armed forces as well as the U.S. Army.
In sum, cooperation with the U.S. Army could
serve as a vehicle for transformation, much as the
NRF and EUBG concepts discussed earlier do. If preferable, the U.S. Army could also support the military
integration of smaller units into a multinational formation. Furthermore, enhanced exchange of information, researchers, and students with U.S. military
educational institutions, to include the U.S. Army War
College (especially the Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute), would efficiently promote strategic understanding.
Multinational cooperation as such is not only
highly efficient but also sends a significant signal
to decision-makers in NATO capitals as well as to
Moscow. Probable benefits could include operational
effects and improved quality rather than increased
cost-efficiency and savings, at least in the short term.
For further utility, these ideas for enhancement should
be extended from exercises to wartime actions, including, at a minimum, territorial defense based on Article 51 of the UN Charter. In Finland and Sweden, this
approach has produced progress since mid-2016 and
state leaders have expressed strong support for the
idea. However, commitments to the defense of one
another are vague, if not non-existent.159
Adding Norway to the equation would support
Norwegian defense capabilities and deterrence policy,
which focus on collective responsibilities toward the
northwest. Similarly, Finland is more interested in
the eastern direction and Sweden in the southeastern
direction toward the Baltic Sea. Naturally, this division
of interests could be redefined into shared responsibilities resulting, for instance, in the following:
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• Norway’s focus on the High North, supported
by Finnish ground capabilities;
• Finland’s focus on the east and nearby Russian
territory, supported by Swedish aerial capabilities; and,
• Sweden’s focus toward the Baltic States and the
sea, supported by Finnish naval capabilities.
This is only one example of a possible division of
geographical responsibilities among the three Nordic
countries. No official or other governmental agreements to strengthen commitments are forthcoming,
but preemptively allocating capabilities to support
one another’s defense would add to that. What exists
today is quite the contrary. Norway focuses first on
NATO obligations, second on national responsibilities,
and third on potential Nordic cooperation. Notably,
this may be changing, as Norway too lacks sufficient
reserves and boots on the ground for defense and
deterrence.
Finnish policy focuses on how to avoid entanglement in any military crisis in the region. In its political
rhetoric, Finland has traditionally ruled out defending the Baltic States, regardless of the obligations laid
out in the Lisbon Treaty. From a Finnish perspective,
NATO carries this responsibility, and Finland is content to defend its own territory. However, this may be
gradually changing if Finland could rely on credible
EU security commitments through the Lisbon Treaty
(§42).160 Of course, Finland and other EU member states
have other means of supporting the Baltic States and
could be useful for regulating some of the Baltic Sea
lines of communication, supporting the Baltic States
militarily, and even defending the coastal region of
Scandinavia. In this context, cooperation with the U.S.
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Army is of great importance and has a lot of mutually
beneficial potential.
Swedish policy has been focused on staying militarily nonaligned in peacetime and remaining neutral
in wartime. Controversially, neutral Sweden would
rely on foreign military support in the event of aggression against it. Sweden abides by the solidarity clause
within the EU, and has even committed to militarily
supporting the Baltic States. However, its current,
grossly undersized defense capabilities and capacities, given its national needs, are at odds with the
message of reciprocal solidarity. Some policy changes
are taking place through the slow growth of defense
spending, the reimplementation of conscription, and
the improvement of military training.161 Logically,
there is a strong need for broader and deeper cooperation with the U.S. Army to meet potential threats.
One strong signal of enhanced cooperation was the
Swedish-led, multinational Aurora 17 exercise on and
around Gotland, with the significant U.S. contribution
of 1,000 service members and a Finnish contingent,
both tasked to defend Swedish territory.162
With all three national viewpoints taken into
account, there is no guaranteed military support available to these countries (apart from allied Norway).
However, some issues should be negotiated and
agreed upon to increase visibility and contribute to
common deterrence. In other words, in a regional crisis
too minor for NATO to react to in the early stages but
beyond the national capabilities of any of the Nordic
countries, proper regional defense arrangements
could lead to sufficiently credible common deterrence.
Taking advantage of the recent convergence of defense
postures, a regional grouping of armed forces based
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on a NATO-led framework could strengthen common
deterrence.
A deeper commitment to strengthening common
deterrence would serve the cause, but how could it
be brought about without formal and official agreements or a defense alliance? In the current situation, it
is prudent to assume that no formal military alliance
is forthcoming for Finland and Sweden. As an alternative one could, together with the U.S. Army, simply
promote deeper and broader information sharing and
jointly plan the operational use of military capabilities.
For an informal military alliance such as this to be successful, it must be based on mutual benefit, trust, and
transparency, and could contribute to the achievement
of an effective deterrent.
In practice, all of this could be done piecemeal by
relevant officials and with the long term in mind. A
workable example of this kind of practical method is
the PfP, which saw Finland and Sweden shift from the
status of neutral, small, and militarily isolated countries to that of well-recognized and closely embedded,
even if militarily nonaligned, NATO partners. Such
progress is achievable with only a minimal degree of
official or binding agreements between the respective nations. Deeper and broader military cooperation
would not be in vain, even in the absence of military
alignment by Finland or Sweden, as it would benefit all participants and contributors and strengthen
common deterrence.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCED
COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. ARMY
Since 2014, NATO has once again focused on
collective defense. The commonalities between the
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Finnish and Swedish armed forces and convergence
on the main task coincide with NATO’s understanding of the security situation, regional threat scenarios,
future plans, and required capabilities. The main conclusion is that this alignment of defense postures could
bring NATO’s allied nations and all Nordic countries
closer together. Wider cooperation in itself sends a significant message to all observers. Consequently, these
developments could strengthen common deterrence
and help tilt the regional military balance between
NATO and Russia in NATO’s favor.
The main recommendation is to promote deeper
and broader, yet gradual, cooperation through steps
taken in the form of practical activities as described
in the previous section, such as information sharing
and jointly planning the operational use of capabilities, thus establishing a common basis for exercising.
The current programs for military exercises constitute a solid basis for consolidated activities in wartime, as mandated in Article 51 of the UN Charter.
As described earlier, and recognizing that Denmark
is a special case with its main interests in the southern Baltic Sea area and the Danish Straits, there are
relevant and mutually beneficial roles and divisions
of responsibilities for the three Nordic armed forces.
The role of the U.S. Army is of crucial importance, but
reciprocal gains are evident, reducing the U.S.-Europe
capability gap.
In this context, deeper and broader military cooperation would contribute to common deterrence
through improved situational awareness, readiness,
fighting power, and long-range standoff capabilities.
Consequently, the following actions should be considered by the U.S. Army and Department of Defense:
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1. Maintaining current international exercises
strongly focusing on actions and operations
informed by real-life threat scenarios and contingency plans for the Nordic-Baltic region.
Tactical details should follow principles such
as environment familiarization and maximization of the technical potential of equipment
from participating units (close air support,
target designation, drones, cyberspace groups,
etc.). Exercises should be closely linked to
the most probable areas of actual operations,
thus responding to the most challenging exercises of the other side, such as Zapad-2017. No
major, additional expenses are foreseen, as the
resources for national and multinational exercises are already in the budgets. These simply
require reallocation.
2. Using joint communications technology facilitated through commonly procured systems.
The first area in which full interoperability (and
compatibility) should be achieved is command
and control. In other words, the concept of full
access to “operational” information (Day-One
Connectivity) is of vital importance for successful exercises and maneuvers in a crisis.
3. Prepositioning of materiel in key operational
areas, which should be used annually within
related planning, training, and exercising. For
instance, one battle group from each country should regularly attend an operationally
motivated, medium- or large-scale exercise in
each country. Similarly, air wings and naval
task groups should deepen current exercise
programs in a multinational and coordinated
fashion. Most of the materiel already exists in
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concentrated storages or can be procured, but
may not be optimally located to serve operational or readiness requirements.
4. Using capabilities in the full operational depth
of the region. Just as Finland could benefit from
greater operational depth in Swedish and Norwegian territories by utilizing naval and air
bases and other support infrastructure instead
of deploying or basing its units near the Russian
border, so too could the U.S. Army utilize the
whole depth of the Nordic region. For Sweden,
utilizing the Finnish maritime and air spaces
would clearly add to the efficiency of its capabilities. This would apply to U.S. capabilities
too, pending national acceptance and appropriate legislation, such as the military Schengen
agreement. For all participants, logistics require
permissive legislation, in-depth coordination,
and linkages with local providers to ensure
effectiveness and efficiency in a crisis.
5. Defining the borderlines between areas of
responsibility for all services or for joint operations in search of reciprocal support to cover
deficits of national and allied defense capabilities. Today this applies especially to air force and
navy cooperation but could be implemented in
land activities as well.
Cooperation with the U.S. Army could be based
on a balancing act, first, with respect to the additional
army capabilities required in the region. The focus
should be on protecting southern parts of Sweden
to ensure the use of infrastructure and services for
NATO activities. In addition, northern Norway should
be secured by army capabilities, including missile
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defense, to ensure NATO’s freedom of movement in
the northern Atlantic and the High North. Arrangements for NATO reinforcements could include a brigade-size force with support elements; in addition,
their use should be coordinated with possible U.S.
Army contributions. Similarly, possible prepositioning of materiel and exercises must be integrated into
relevant parts of defense plans and related international exercise programs.
Second, cooperation with the U.S. Army could be
based on enhanced deterrence, including anti-access/
area denial. This cooperation could be established on a
strengthened front line; made to bolster relevant capabilities, such as missile defense near Russian territories; and made to include strategically important areas
in Norway, Finland, Sweden, and the Baltic States.
Recently published analyses and reports related to
the defense of the Baltic States provide useful case
studies, such as a rotational armored brigade combat
team or permanent trigger units for more detailed
consideration.
While none of these measures need necessarily
involve the permanent stationing of substantial U.S.
combat forces in the front-line states, it is essential that
this option be kept open and prominent in the debate
on policy options for a U.S. presence in Europe. This
debate in itself constitutes a deterrent measure since
such stationing would constitute an immediate, major
security concern for Russia and, consequently, an
eventuality which Russia would seek to avoid.
Finally, as widely recognized, the security situation
in the Baltic Sea region concerns the common interests of NATO as well as NATO partners Finland and
Sweden. These common interests will not fade and
will remain on the agenda for the foreseeable future.
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This reinforces the importance of the two Nordic partners in the eyes of NATO and its member states. Similarly, NATO will remain a critically important actor
for the two partners, situated as they are in the middle
of the region. The key issue is to make both Nordic
partners part of a holistic approach and net contributors to the shared deterrence that protects vital U.S.
interests in Europe.
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